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GENDER DISPARITIES IN PLEA BARGAINING
CARLOS BERDEJÓ*

Across wide-ranging contexts, academic literature and the popular
press have identified pervasive gender disparities favoring men over
women in society. One area in which gender disparities have conversely
favored women is the criminal justice system. Most of the empirical
research examining gender disparities in criminal case outcomes has
focused on judges’ sentencing decisions. Few studies have assessed
disparities in the steps leading up to a defendant’s conviction, where
various actors make choices that constrain judges’ ultimate sentencing
discretion. This Article addresses this gap by examining gender
disparities in the plea-bargaining process. The results presented in this
Article reveal significant gender disparities in this stage of the criminal
justice system.
Female defendants are about twenty percent more likely than male
defendants to have their principal initial charge dropped or reduced.
These gender disparities are greater in cases involving misdemeanors
and low-level felonies. In cases involving serious felonies, male and
female defendants achieve similar outcomes. Defendants’ criminal
histories also play a key role in mediating gender disparities. While
female defendants with no prior convictions receive charge reductions
more often than male defendants with no prior convictions, male and
female defendants with prior convictions are afforded similar treatment.
These patterns in gender disparities suggest that in these “low
information” cases gender may be being used as a proxy for a defendant’s
latent criminality and likelihood to recidivate.
Building upon these results and the existing literature documenting
racial disparities in criminal case outcomes, the Article explores the
intersection of gender and race in determining disparities in the pleabargaining process. The results indicate that gender and racial
disparities complement each other in a way that yields additive effects.
The charge reduction rate for white female defendants is more than
double that of black male defendants. White male and black female
defendants experience similar charge reduction rates, in between those of
white female and black male defendants. Consistent with the pattern of
gender disparities documented in the Article, these intergroup disparities
are greater in cases involving misdemeanor offenses and defendants with
no prior convictions.
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INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of gender disparities favoring men over women has been the
subject of increased scrutiny in the academic literature and popular press. Much of
the empirical literature examining these gender disparities has focused on labor
market outcomes, finding that women are less likely to be hired than equally
qualified men and that females earn lower wages than their male counterparts. 1

1. See, e.g., Debra A. Barbezat & James W. Hughes, Salary Structure Effects and the
Gender Pay Gap in Academia, 46 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 621, 628 (2005) (finding that male
faculty earn 20.7% more than comparable female faculty); Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin
& Lawrence F. Katz, Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial
and Corporate Sectors, 2 AM. ECON. J. 228, 236 (2010) (analyzing a sample of business school
graduates and finding that “[w]omen earn $115K on average at graduation, and $250K nine
years out; [while] men earn $130K on average at graduation, and $400K nine years out”);
Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs, 55 INDUS.
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Instances of various forms of gender-based discrimination in the workplace are well
documented.2 There is also extensive work examining gender disparities that
adversely impact women in many other areas including the sciences, 3 sports,4
healthcare,5 and even in the purchase of a new car.6
The criminal justice system is one area in which gender disparities have
traditionally favored women relative to men. Studies examining federal and state
criminal cases have documented the existence of sentencing disparities favoring

& LAB. REL. REV. 3, 5 (2001) (finding that females in top corporate positions earn thirty-three
percent less than males); Dan A. Black, Amelia M. Haviland, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J.
Taylor, Gender Wage Disparities Among the Highly Educated, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 630,
656 (2008) (noting that well-educated females earn thirty percent less than similar males, but
arguing that most of the gap is explained by premarket factors); Claudia Goldin & Cecilia
Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 737–38 (2000) (finding that the use of blind auditions increases the
probability of female musicians being hired, evidence which suggests, according to the
authors, that gender discrimination plays an important role in the hiring process).
2. See, e.g., Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2245, 2254–57 (2010) (explaining various reasons behind the attrition of female attorneys and
the “glass ceiling” effect in large law firms); Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Tech Industry’s GenderDiscrimination Problem, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2017/11/20/the-tech-industrys-gender-discrimination-problem [https://perma.cc
/S39R-M3EZ] (describing the various forms of discrimination faced by female employees in
technology companies); Kim Parker & Cary Funk, Gender Discrimination Comes in Many
Forms for Today’s Working Women, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Dec. 14, 2017), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/14/gender-discrimination-comes-in-many-forms
-for-todays-working-women/ [https://perma.cc/PW9V-BTVS] (summarizing results from a
survey in which forty-two percent of women said they have faced discrimination on the job
because of their gender and describing various examples).
3. See Phyllis L. Carr, Laura Szalacha, Rosalind Barnett, Cheryl Caswell & Thomas
Inui, A “Ton of Feathers”: Gender Discrimination in Academic Medical Careers and How to
Manage It, 12 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1009, 1010–11 (2003) (finding that forty percent of survey
respondents ranked gender discrimination as the main factor hindering their career in
academic medicine); Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark
J. Graham & Jo Handelsman, Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students,
109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 16474, 16477 (2012) (finding that “both male and
female faculty judged a female student to be less competent and less worthy of being hired
than an identical male student, and also offered her a smaller starting salary and less career
mentoring”).
4. See Alia Wong, Where Girls Are Missing Out on High-School Sports, ATLANTIC (June
26, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/06/girls-high-school-sportsinequality/396782/ [https://perma.cc/QJH3-FRYV].
5. See Fay Schopen, The Healthcare Gender Bias: Do Men Get Better Medical
Treatment?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/lifeandstyle/2017/nov/20/healthcare-gender-bias-women-pain
[https://perma.cc/58HL
-UBC7].
6. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for
a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 319 (1995) (finding that female customers are quoted
higher prices when purchasing a car than male customers).
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female defendants (i.e., male defendants are more likely to be incarcerated and
receive longer sentences than similarly situated female defendants.7 Fewer studies,
however, have examined whether gender disparities exist in the plea-bargaining
process8 and explored the role of race in mediating these gender disparities).9
This Article fills these gaps in the literature by examining disparities in the pleabargaining process that precede judges’ sentencing decisions and constrain judges’
sentencing discretion.10 Using data obtained from the Wisconsin circuit courts, this
Article documents striking gender disparities in the plea-bargaining process. Female
defendants are approximately twenty percent more likely than male defendants to
have their most serious initial charge dropped or reduced to a less severe charge (i.e.,
male defendants are more likely than female defendants to be convicted of their
highest initial charge).11
More in-depth analyses reveal two patterns that shed light as to the underlying
dynamics behind these gender disparities. First, disparities in plea-bargaining
outcomes are driven by cases in which defendants have no prior convictions. 12 In
cases involving defendants with prior convictions there are no significant gender
disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes.13 Second, gender disparities in pleabargaining outcomes are greater in cases involving misdemeanors and low-level
felonies relative to cases involving more serious offenses. 14 These patterns suggest
that prosecutors may be using gender as a proxy for a defendant’s latent criminality
and recidivism risk in “low information” cases (i.e., cases in which observable
characteristics of the defendant and the offense provide little information about the
defendant’s inherent criminality).15
Building upon these results and the existing literature documenting racial
disparities in criminal case outcomes, this Article explores the intersection of gender
and race in determining disparities in charge reductions. 16 The results indicate that
gender and racial disparities complement each other in a manner that yields additive
effects. The charge reduction rate for white females (the group with the highest rate)
is more than double that of black males (the group with the lowest rate). 17 White
males and black females experience similar charge reduction rates, which fall
between those of white females and black males.18 Consistent with the pattern of

7. See infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 44–56 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Section I.A.
11. See infra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. Although existing studies have controlled
for the prior criminal history of defendants when examining gender disparities in criminal case
outcomes, these have not explored the interaction of this variable with the defendant’s gender.
See infra Section I.B.1.
13. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section III.A.2.
15. See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Section III.B.1.
17. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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gender disparities documented in this Article, these intergroup disparities are greater
in cases involving misdemeanor offenses and defendants with no prior convictions. 19
In addition to uncovering gender disparities in the plea-bargaining process, this
Article contributes to a pair of current policy debates. First, the evidence presented
in this Article sheds light on the question surrounding the role that the disparate
impact theory should play in equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Historically, courts have been reluctant to accept statistical evidence
showing patterns of discrimination to establish an equal protection claim, instead
requiring plaintiffs to show a discriminatory intent or purpose.20 Several scholars
have been critical of the high burden placed on plaintiffs as a result of this
requirement, which often renders the Equal Protection Clause an ineffectual tool for
combating discrimination in the criminal justice system. 21 If subconscious biases do
contribute to disparities (e.g., by the use of gender and race as a proxy for a
defendant’s latent criminality),22 there would be no constitutional means to address
these under the evidentiary requirements articulated by the courts.23 The nature of
the biases documented in this Article affirms the need to reexamine the role of
evidence showing disparate impact in equal protection claims.
The evidence presented in this Article also touches upon a second current policy
debate—the treatment of misdemeanors in the criminal justice system. Although

19. See infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that evidence of
the unjustified racially disparate impact was insufficient to support an equal protection claim
against a state’s capital punishment regime); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
274 (1979) (holding that a discriminatory purpose was not established by a foreseeable
disproportionate impact on women and that discriminatory intent must be proven in addition
to discriminatory impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that
statistical evidence of the unjustified racially disparate impact of an employment policy was
insufficient to mount an equal protection challenge to the policy).
21. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1031 (1988) (“The dissatisfaction with the discriminatory purpose
doctrine has several facets, but a recurring theme in the literature is the difficulty of proving
discriminatory purpose.”); David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially
Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 106–20 (2007) (arguing
that “the Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of intentional racial discrimination
before a court may consider legal remedies”).
22. See infra notes 66–73, 86–91 and accompanying text; see also Timothy D. Wilson,
Samuel Lindsey & Tonya Y. Schooler, A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101,
102 (2000) (explaining how individuals can harbor implicit biases distinct from their explicit
attitudes).
23. See Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans: What
History and the First Decade of Twenty-First Century Have Brought, 11 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L
STUD. 87, 104 (2011) (“Each decision point of the criminal justice system: arrest by law
enforcement; arraignment, release, and pre-adjudicatory hearings; pre-trial jail and prison
custody; adjudication and sentencing; probation and community supervision; and parole
decisions are all exercised with various levels of discretion and subject to covert, overt, and
unconscious biases.”); Johnson, supra note 21, at 1019 (“The concept of purposeful
discrimination, or at least its terminology, does not mesh well with unconscious race
discrimination.”).
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misdemeanors have traditionally been overlooked due to the low-level nature of the
offenses and the shorter sentences involved, recent work has highlighted their
significant role in generating disparities in criminal case outcomes.24 The fact that
the disparities documented in this Article are greater in cases involving
misdemeanors and the disproportionate impact suffered by black males adds urgency
to the debate surrounding the deregulation and decriminalization of these offenses.25
In fact, according to scholars, it is in these misdemeanor cases where black men
begin to be labeled as criminals.26
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the existing evidence on
gender disparities in criminal case outcomes, highlighting the limited attention that
has been devoted to the plea-bargaining process. Part II provides some background
information on the criminal justice system in Wisconsin and describes the dataset
and the construction of the variables used in the analyses. The results of these
analyses are presented in Part III. The policy implications of these results and
avenues for future research are discussed in the conclusion.

24. Although certainly less serious and severe than felony convictions, misdemeanor
convictions can carry major consequences for individuals. For one, a defendant can be
incarcerated, even if it is not for a long period of time. Even defendants receiving a fine or
probation as punishment for their misdemeanor convictions are likely to be eventually
imprisoned if they are unable to pay their fines or if they violate a condition of their probation.
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1081–82
(2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization]. Misdemeanor convictions
can also affect a person’s future interaction with the criminal justice system and other public
institutions. A misdemeanor conviction becomes part of the defendant’s criminal history and
can be considered by a judge in a future case when determining bail and sentencing. Irene
Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758 (2017).
Moreover, there can also be collateral consequences for a defendant convicted of a
misdemeanor offense, such as loss of eligibility for student loan assistance or public housing.
Id. at 763–66.
25. Misdemeanor cases provide defendants fewer structural and procedural protections
than felony cases, creating a system with lower evidentiary standards, prone to higher rates of
wrongful convictions and where appellate review and scrutiny is limited. See Joe, supra note
24, at 761 (“Misdemeanor convictions also receive less rigorous appellate review than felony
convictions.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315–17 (2012)
[hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (arguing that misdemeanor convictions are “generated
in ways that baldly contradict the standard due process model of criminal adjudication” and
that “the lack of procedural integrity in petty offense processing generates wrongful
convictions”); Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, supra note 24, at 1063–64 (“Unlike
its felony counterpart, the misdemeanor arena is severely underregulated, informal, and
sloppy.”). This is particularly problematic since misdemeanors comprise the vast majority of
criminal cases and for most individuals represent the first point of contact with the criminal
justice system. Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, supra note 24, at 1063 (noting that
misdemeanors comprise “around eighty percent of most state dockets” and that the
“misdemeanor process is the gateway to the criminal system”).
26. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 25, at 1368 (“It is here that high-volume
convictions of questionable evidentiary validity are generated against young black men . . . .”).
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I. GENDER, RACE, AND CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES
The first Section of this Part describes the critical role of prosecutorial discretion
and the plea-bargaining process in determining criminal case outcomes, highlighting
the limited attention that has been devoted in the empirical literature to this particular
stage. The second Section summarizes the empirical literature that has explored
gender disparities in criminal case outcomes and describes the various theories that
have been proffered to explain these disparities. The third and last Section of this
Part discusses the role played by defendants’ race in mediating gender disparities in
criminal case outcomes.
A. The Critical Role of Prosecutors
Most of the literature exploring gender and racial disparities in criminal case
outcomes has focused on judges’ sentencing decisions.27 However, the sentencing
hearing is the last stage of a process in which many other actors in the criminal justice
system make decisions that have a substantial impact on a defendant’s ultimate fate.
For example, police officers choose whether or not to stop and arrest a suspect.28
And prosecutors decide which charges (if any) to initially file against a defendant
and whether to subsequently drop or amend a charge, often as part of a pleabargaining agreement negotiated with the defendant’s counsel.29 The judge sitting at
the end of this process takes the choices made by these actors—for example, the

27. See infra note 37–38 and accompanying text.
28. Existing studies have found that policing practices disproportionately target black
individuals, who are also more likely to be arrested and charged than white individuals. See,
e.g., Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 187–
90 (2013) (finding that police arrests black individuals more often for drug crimes than white
individuals); Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City
Police Department's “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 813–14 (2007) (finding that black individuals were stopped more
frequently than white individuals even after controlling for a variety of factors); LYNN
LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011,
at 9 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KBU-Y3TP]
(noting that black drivers are about three times more likely to be searched during a traffic stop
than white drivers and that black individuals are twice as likely to be arrested than white
individuals). Although fewer studies have examined gender disparities in arrests and policing
practices, the evidence suggests that women receive more lenient treatment from police than
men. See Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law
Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita, 116 ECON. J. F351, F364
(2006) (finding that “males are searched four times as often as females” during a traffic stop);
Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 127, 147–48 (2015) (“The empirical evidence on gender and policing is limited.”); Lisa
Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D’Alessio, Sex Differences in the Likelihood of Arrest, 32 J. CRIM.
JUST. 443, 448–50 (2004) (finding that reported crimes involving female offenders are less
likely to lead to arrests than those involving male offenders).
29. See infra notes 33–36, 108–10 and accompanying text.
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crime of conviction agreed upon in a plea bargain—as a given when exercising
discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. 30
As a result, judges’ sentencing discretion is constrained in a number of ways.
Criminal statutes often prescribe a minimum and maximum sentence for a particular
crime, which are set by the legislature when enacting the law that criminalizes a
given actitivity. Moreover, various states and the federal government have adopted
sentencing guidelines that generally provide a set of recommended sentencing ranges
which are determined by an offense score (a function of the conviction crime) and
the defendants’ criminal history. 31 The applicable sentencing guidelines range and
statutory minimum and maximum sentences are ultimately determined by the crime
the defendant is convicted of.32 Except in cases adjudicated in a bench trial, the judge
has no direct control over the ultimate crime of conviction, which itself is, in the vast
majority of cases, a result of the plea-bargaining agreement between the defendant’s
counsel and the prosecuting attorney. 33 Not surprisingly, prosecutors are considered
by many scholars to be the most influential players in the criminal justice system. 34
Prosecutorial discretion in the plea-bargaining process can play a role in
determining the conviction crime through various channels: serious charges that
were initially filed against a defendant may be reduced to less serious ones (which
then become the conviction offense), 35 concurrent charges involving less serious
crimes may be dropped, charges involving felony crimes may be reduced to
misdemeanors, or all charges carrying a possible incarceration term may be dropped
or reduced to charges that carry no possible jail or prison time. 36
Empirical work analyzing the link between prosecutorial discretion and gender
and racial disparities has been limited, at least compared to work analyzing judicial
behavior and sentencing disparities.37 One of the reasons why so much empirical

30. See infra notes 31, 113–19 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, 1–5 (2015).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 5 (“Over 95 percent of federal defendants convicted . . . are adjudicated [on
the basis of a guilty plea.]”).
34. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 5 (2007); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal
Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1326 (2014) (“Legal scholars, judges, and
practitioners broadly agree that prosecutorial decisions play a dominant role in determining
sentences.”); Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions:
Examining Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts,
27 JUST. Q. 394, 398 (2010).
35. See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 411, 418 (finding that about twelve percent
of all federal prosecutions involve a charge reduction and that such reductions shorten ultimate
sentences by about twenty percent).
36. See id. at 395; Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories
of Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2007). Moreover, prosecutors also enjoy ample
discretion in deciding which initial charges to file, a choice that defines the starting point of
any plea-bargaining negotiations. Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 395.
37. See BESIKI KUTATELADZE, VANESSA LYNN & EDWARD LIANG, DO RACE AND
ETHNICITY MATTER IN PROSECUTION?: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 1 (2012) [hereinafter
KUTATELADZE ET AL., RACE AND ETHNICITY] (“Relative to the attention that police and the
courts have received from researchers analyzing disproportionate minority contact with the
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work has focused on judges’ sentencing decisions is the fact that public entities at
the state and federal levels collect and maintain comprehensive data on sentencing,
which generally excludes presentencing information and cases not resulting in a
conviction.38 As a result of these data limitations, the existing literature examining
gender and race disparities in plea bargaining suffers two related shortcomings:
studies have mostly focused on a specific subset of crimes, relying on a relatively
low number of observations, and have often reached inconsistent results.39
B. Gender Disparities in Criminal Case Outcomes
This Section discusses the existing empirical and theoretical work examining
gender disparities in the criminal justice process. It begins with an overview of the
empirical literature that has identified significant gender disparities in sentencing and
plea-bargaining outcomes, followed by a review of the theoretical work that has
attempted to explain these disparities.
1. Documenting Gender Disparities
Studies examining gender disparities in sentencing in federal cases have found
that female defendants are less likely than male defendants to be incarcerated40 and

criminal justice system, there has been little study of prosecution.”); Rehavi & Starr, supra
note 34, at 1326 (noting that “prior empirical studies of racial and other demographic
disparities in sentencing have considered judicial sentencing decisions only in isolation from
the prosecutorial choices that preceded them”); Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 395
(noting the scant literature in the area).
38. See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 396 (summarizing existing literature on the
topic) (“The limited empirical attention devoted to prosecutorial discretion is largely the result
of data limitations. Whereas data on judicial sentencing decisions are now readily available,
records on prosecutorial charging behavior remain elusive.”). More generally, prosecutorial
decision-making has been an area that traditionally has been less open to the public than
sentencing. See BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS & MARY CROWLEY, VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 1, (2014) [KUTATELADZE ET
AL., RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN] (“While prosecutorial discretion is often guided
by internal policies, external regulation or oversight of this discretion is quite limited.”);
WAYNE MCKENZIE, DON STEMEN, DEREK COURSEN & ELIZABETH FARID, VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION 1 (2009) (“Unlike officials in law enforcement and the judiciary, who have
come under varying degrees of oversight in recent years . . . prosecutors act with little outside
scrutiny or governance.”).
39. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra note 37, at 12–14
(summarizing existing studies examining racial disparities in dismissals and charge
reductions); Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 400 (describing the methodological
limitations of existing studies examining gender and racial disparities in dismissals and charge
reductions).
40. See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001) (finding that female
defendants are more likely to be assigned no prison term than male defendants); Max
Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level
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that female defendants receive on average shorter sentences than male defendants. 41
Similar studies focusing on state criminal cases have also documented differences in
incarceration rates42 and sentencing outcomes43 between male and female
defendants.
Fewer studies have focused on gender disparities in the plea-bargaining process.
Although mixed, the existing evidence, viewed as a whole, suggests that female
defendants receive more favorable treatment relative to male defendants. A group of
early studies identified no gender disparities in plea bargaining. For example, a 1977
study analyzed charge reductions in a sample of 1435 cases in an undisclosed city in

Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 84 (2005) (finding that women are 4.5
percentage points less likely than men to be imprisoned).
41. See, e.g., Mustard, supra note 40, at 306 (finding that female defendants receive
sentences that are 5.4 months lower than those received by male defendants); Schanzenbach,
supra note 40, at 72 (finding that female defendants on average receive sentences that are 5.4
months lower than those received by males in federal criminal cases).
42. E.g., Cassia Spohn & Dawn Beichner, Is Preferential Treatment of Female Offenders
a Thing of the Past? A Multisite Study of Gender, Race, and Imprisonment, 11 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 149, 164 (2000) (finding that “men were about 1½ times more likely than women
to be incarcerated in Miami and more than 2½ times more likely than women to be
incarcerated in Chicago and Kansas City”); Cassia C. Spohn & Jeffrey W. Spears, Gender and
Case Processing Decisions: A Comparison of Case Outcomes for Male and Female
Defendants Charged with Violent Felonies, WOMEN & CRIM. JUST., 1997, at 29, 38 (analyzing
a sample involving violent felonies and finding that male defendants are incarcerated in
seventy-five percent of cases while female defendants are incarcerated 47.8% of the time);
Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Does Gender Modify the Effects of Race–Ethnicity
on Criminal Sanctioning? Sentences for Male and Female White, Black, and Hispanic
Defendants, 22. J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 241, 252 (2006) [hereinafter Steffensmeier &
Demuth, Does Gender Modify the Effects of Race] (finding that “[t]he odds of incarceration
for male defendants are about 71% higher than the odds of incarceration for female
defendants” in a sample of cases from the largest U.S. counties); Darrell Steffensmeier, John
Kramer & Cathy Streifel, Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 428
(1993) [hereinafter Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions] (finding that
“male offenders have, on average, about 12% greater likelihood of being incarcerated than
female offenders” in a dataset of Pennsylvania felonies); Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer
& John Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The
Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 763, 776 (1998)
[hereinafter Steffensmeier et al., Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing] (finding that
“females’ odds of incarceration are almost half those of males (which yield an almost 15%
lesser probability of incarceration than males)”).
43. See, e.g., Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 38 (analyzing a sample involving violent
felonies and finding that male defendants are sentenced on average to 1492 days in prison
while female defendants are sentenced on average to 1064 days in prison); Steffensmeier &
Demuth, Does Gender Modify the Effects of Race, supra note 42, at 252 (finding that “[m]ale
sentences are about 20% . . . longer than female sentences”); Steffensmeier et al., Race,
Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing, supra note 42, at 776 (finding that “females receive
sentence lengths that are about six and one-half months less than males”).
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New York44 and found no gender disparities.45 A similar study in 1984 by Bishop
and Frazier examined 250 cases from Florida46 and found no significant differences
in charge reductions between male and female defendants. 47 In a 1992 study,
Albonetti analyzed 400 burglary and robbery cases in Jacksonville, Florida, finding
no evidence of gender differences in the decision to reduce initial charges. 48 A study
using 1998 data from the largest U.S. counties found no correlation between gender
and case dismissals.49
Other studies, however, have documented gender disparities in plea-bargaining
outcomes. Spohn examined a sample of 33,000 cases from Los Angeles County
adjudicated between 1977 and 1980,50 finding that female defendants are more likely
than male defendants to have charges against them initially rejected or later
dismissed.51 Using a sample of 9966 felony thefts and 18,176 felony assaults in
California adjudicated in 1988, Farnworth and Teske find that female defendants
with no prior record were more likely to receive charge reductions relative to male
defendants.52 In a 1997 study examining 6980 cases involving violent felonies in
Michigan,53 Spohn and Spears find that for male defendants the severity of the most
serious initial charge is reduced 44.3% of the time, while for females this reduction
rate is 56.4%.54
The studies described so far focused on criminal cases at the state level. Recent
studies examining federal criminal cases have uncovered evidence that suggest that

44. Ilene Nagel Bernstein, Edward Kick, Jan T. Leung & Barbara Schulz, Charge
Reduction: An Intermediary Stage in the Process of Labelling Criminal Defendants, 56 SOC.
FORCES 362, 372 (1977). These include cases in which the most severe initial charge “was a
second or third degree burglary or related offenses, a first, second, or third degree assault, a
second or third degree grand larceny, petit larceny, or a first, second or third degree robbery.”
Id.
45. See id. at 374–75.
46. Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Effects of Gender on Charge Reduction,
25 SOC. Q. 385, 388 (1984). These cases come from an undisclosed judicial district and
exclude the lowest class of misdemeanors. See id.
47. Id. at 391. These results were consistent when dividing the sample by type of crime
(e.g., violent offenses, property crimes, offenses against public welfare and order). Id. at 393.
48. Celesta A. Albonetti, Charge Reduction: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Burglary and Robbery Cases, 8 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMONOLOGY 317, 325–30 (1992)
[hereinafter Albonetti, Charge Reduction].
49. Travis W. Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial Dismissals: A Multilevel
Analysis of Case-and County-Level Factors, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 693, 697 (2010).
50. Cassia Spohn, John Gruhl & Susan Welch, The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender
of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175,
179 (1987).
51. Id. at 183–85.
52. Margaret Farnworth & Raymond H. C. Teske, Jr., Gender Differences in Felony
Court Processing: Three Hypotheses of Disparity, WOMEN & CRIM. JUST., 1995, at 23.
53. Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 34. Cases in the sample included at least one of the
following violent felonies as a charge: murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, criminal
sexual conduct, robbery, and various forms of felony assault. Sexual assault cases were
excluded from their sample. Of their 6980 cases, 648 involve female defendants. Id.
54. Id. at 38. This pattern is consistent across different types of crimes. See id. at 43.
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gender disparities in plea bargaining also exist at the federal level. In their 2011
study, Shermer and Johnson find that male offenders are 0.68 times as likely as
female offenders to receive a charge reduction in federal criminal cases. 55 After
decomposing ultimate sentence disparities between male and female defendants in
federal criminal cases, Starr finds evidence suggesting that significant disparities
favoring women are introduced at every stage of the process, including charging and
charge bargaining.56
2. Explaining Gender Disparities
Various explanations have been set forth to account for the existence of gender
disparities in criminal case outcomes. The most intuitive theory is that differences in
defendant and crime characteristics explain these gender disparities.57 For example,
male defendants have on average more extensive criminal records and are convicted
of more serious crimes than female defendants.58 Demographic defendant
characteristics, such as age59 and race,60 which have been found to correlate with
criminal case outcomes, could also be correlated with gender. However, differences
in these case and defendant characteristics are observable to researchers and are
controlled for in most studies.
More problematic are crime and defendant characteristics that are observable to
judges or prosecutors but unobservable to the researcher (and therefore not controlled
for in the studies cited earlier). For example, male defendants may commit a given
crime in a more heinous way than female defendants, thus deserving less lenient
treatment.61 Similar, unobservable factors that could also be driving these gender

55. Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 413. These gender disparities are largely driven
by violent and drug offenses (and to a lesser extent property, fraud, and public order crimes).
See id. at 415.
56. See Starr, supra note 28, at 139–41.
57. For instance, the severity of the conviction offense and the defendant’s criminal
history are associated with higher rates of incarceration and longer prison sentences. Mustard,
supra note 40, at 306; Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’
Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 161 (2001)
[hereinafter Steffensmeier & Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’].
58. See Mustard, supra note 40, at 296; Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 31 (“The
differences in the sentences imposed on men and women may be due to justifiable legal factors
which judges consider when sentencing offenders, such as the seriousness of the crime and
the offender’s prior criminal record.”).
59. Existing work suggests that younger defendants receive harsher punishment than
older defendants. E.g., Mustard, supra note 40, at 309 (finding that younger defendants receive
on average higher sentences); Steffensmeier & Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’, supra note 57,
at 161 (finding than older defendants are less likely to be incarcerated and receive longer
sentences than younger defendants).
60. See Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 31. (“Another factor that might be confounding
the results of these studies is the race of the defendant.”); infra Section I.C.1.
61. See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 421 (“Female crime tends to be less severe
in its consequences (e.g., less serious victim injury) and female offenders are more likely to
have unique histories of victimization as well as special family circumstances that may serve
to mitigate their culpability.”); Starr, supra note 28, at 148 (“For instance, men might well
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disparities include the role played by female defendants in the planning and
execution of a crime and their willingness to cooperate with authorities—if women
tend to be mere accomplices and play a minor roles in crimes62 and/or are more
willing to cooperate with authorities, 63 then we should expect them to be afforded
greater leniency by judges and prosecutors alike.
A separate set of theories seeking to explain gender disparities in criminal case
outcomes hinges around nonlegal factors, such as protective paternalism, as the
reasons driving the more lenient treatment received by female defendants in the
hands of judges and prosecutors. 64 Similar explanations highlight concerns
associated with the social costs that result from imprisoning female defendants who,
as mothers, have existing responsibilities towards their family and children.65
A more theoretically rigorous approach focuses on the role played by uncertainty
and incomplete information on judicial and prosecutorial decision-making. This line
of models starts with the assumption that judges and prosecutors must make their
decisions without full knowledge of the defendant’s likelihood of recidivating and
the danger that the defendant represents to the community, factors that arguably help
determine the optimal outcome in a criminal case.66 Facing time and information

commit violent crimes with greater physical force, a difference not fully captured by the arrest
code (beyond the labeling of some assaults as ‘aggravated’).”).
62. See Schanzenbach, supra note 40, at 63 (“If women are . . . accomplices in a manner
that the guidelines do not fully account for, it is possible that the unexplained disparity is not
motivated by bias.”); Starr, supra note 28, at 149 (“Women might be viewed as minor
players—perhaps mere accessories of their male romantic partners. Prosecutors and judges
may consider such women less dangerous, less morally culpable, or useful sources of
testimony; if so, leniency may be legally appropriate.”); Steffensmeier et al., Gender and
Imprisonment Decisions, supra note 42, at 432–33, 438 (noting that playing a minor role in a
crime or acting as an accomplice serves as a justifications for sentencing guideline departures
that may favor female defendants).
63. Starr, supra note 28, at 151 (“Another often-advanced theory is that females receive
leniency because they are more cooperative with the government.”).
64. Schanzenbach, supra note 40, at 63 (“Some scholars have interpreted the existence of
a sex disparity that favors women as evidence that a paternalistic or chivalrous bias exists
among judges . . . .”); Spohn & Beichner, supra note 42, at 151; Spohn & Spears, supra note
42, at 31 (“Most researchers conclude that this preferential treatment reflects paternalism or,
alternatively, chivalry. According to this view, criminal justice officials treat women more
leniently than men because they feel that women are physically weaker than men and thus
must be protected from the harshness of the criminal justice system. . . .”).
65. Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 31 (“The differences also might reflect more
practical concerns about the childcare responsibilities of female defendants . . . because
[judges] assume that many female defendants have young children and thus feel that sending
these defendants to prison would both disrupt family life and place the burden of caring for
the children on society.”); Starr, supra note 28, at 150 (“Another possible explanation is that
prosecutors or judges worry about the effect of maternal incarceration on children.”);
Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, supra note 42, at 411–12
(“Considered together, the studies substantiate the widely held belief that female defendants
receive more lenient treatment (apparently) because of judicial paternalism, the social costs to
children and families of sending women to prison . . . .”).
66. Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial Discretion, 38
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constraints, judges67 and prosecutors68 may use salient and observable defendant
characteristics, such as race, gender, or age, as heuristics or proxies for those
unobservable attributes relating to the risk posed by the defendant. To the extent that
male offenders are perceived as more dangerous and crime prone, as well as less
amenable to rehabilitation, than female offenders, one may expect judges and
prosecutors to be less lenient with male defendants. 69

SOC. PROBS. 247, 250 (1991) [hereinafter Albonetti, Judicial Discretion] (“[U]ncertainty
surrounding the sentencing decision arises from an inability to predict accurately future
criminal behavior.”); Sara Steen, Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. Gainey, Images of Danger
and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, and Criminal Sentencing, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 463 (2005) (“[B]ecause they lack complete information about individual
cases, decision makers form causal attributions for offending and assess dangerousness and
culpability by referencing stereotypes.”); Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment
Decisions, supra note 42, at 766–67.
67. See Albonetti, Judicial Discretion, supra note 66, at 250 (“Using defendant
characteristics, circumstances of the crime, and case processing outcomes, judges assess the
defendant’s disposition toward future criminal activity . . . Discrimination and disparity in
sentencing decisions . . . may be the product of judicial attempts to achieve a ‘bounded
rationality’ in sentencing by relying on stereotypical images of which defendant is most likely
to recidivate.”); Celesta A. Albonetti, The Joint Conditioning Effect of Defendant’s Gender
and Ethnicity on Length of Imprisonment Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Drug
Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 39, 42 (2002) (“From the
uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution perspective, the defendant’s gender and ethnicity are
salient to attributions of an enduring predisposition to criminal activity and dangerousness. As
such, these defendant characteristics influence judicial sentencing decisions.”); Steffensmeier
et al., Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing, supra note 42, at 768 (“Hence, one
might expect that judges, both as citizens and as elected officials, may share in the general
stereotyping predominant in the community; and that racial (as well as age and gender)
attributions will intertwine with the focal concerns outlined above to influence judges in
deciding whether to incarcerate an offender and the length of the incarceration.”).
68. See Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta,
David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin,
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1141–42 (2012) (arguing that that
prosecutors are likely to be subject to implicit biases in the discharge of their duties given the
fact that they have “wide discretion” and have to make “quick decisions with little
accountability”); Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 402–03 (arguing that prosecutors “are
faced with uncertainty that may lead them to develop decision-making schema that incorporate
past practices and reflect the subtle influences of social and cultural stereotypes in society”
and thus “are likely to develop ‘perceptual shorthands’ . . . that tie attributions of
dangerousness to the ascriptive characteristics of offenders and their victims”); Robert J.
Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796–98 (2012) (noting that prosecutors
use determinations about the danger posed by an individual to society when exercising their
discretion).
69. See Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 421 (arguing that the gender disparities in
plea-bargaining that they identify “are consistent with the theoretical interpretation that
prosecutors engage in a social attribution process that links males to increased dangerousness
and heightened risks of recidivism”); Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 31 (“[C]riminal
justice officials treat women more leniently than men because they feel that women are . . .
less culpable, less dangerous, or less likely to recidivate than men and thus deserve less
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Some scholars have noted that under this theoretical approach, gender disparities
should be greater in cases involving less serious offenses and first-time offenders, as
women who have a prior criminal record or commit more serious offenses (in
particular, violent crimes) have provided observable evidence of their latent
criminality and departed from “female stereotypes.”70 However, the empirical
evidence does not seem to fully support this hypothesis. 71 While some studies
analyzing sentencing disparities find that gender disparities appear to be greater in
cases involving low-level offenses such as misdemeanors, others find that disparities
are greater in cases involving more serious offenses. 72 And studies focusing
specifically on plea-bargaining outcomes have found that females receive more
lenient treatment than males in cases involving serious offenses. 73

punitive treatment.”); Starr, supra note 28, at 153 (“Perhaps the likeliest mechanism is that
prosecutors or judges assume men are more dangerous than women.”); Steffensmeier et al.,
Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, supra note 42, at 411–12; Steffensmeier et al., Race,
Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing, supra note 42, at 768–69 (“Our main premise is that
race, age, and gender will interact to influence sentencing because of images or attributions
relating these statuses to membership in social groups thought to be dangerous and crime
prone.”).
70. See Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 32–33 (discussing the “evil woman thesis,
which hypothesizes that female offenders whose crimes conflict with stereotypes concerning
‘appropriate’ female behavior will be sanctioned more harshly than men who commit these
types of crimes” and hypothesizing “that there will be no significant differences in the
treatment of male and female defendants charged with violent felonies once relevant legal
factors are taken into consideration”); Spohn & Beichner, supra note 42, at 151 (“Other
studies, in accord with the so-called evil woman thesis, conclude that women, particularly
those who commit the more ‘masculine’ violent crimes, are treated either no differently or
more harshly than are men who commit these crimes.”); Steffensmeier et al., Gender and
Imprisonment Decisions, supra note 42, at 429 (“Regarding offense seriousness, some
commentators hypothesize that women are more likely to receive favorable outcomes when
the courts are responding to defendants charged with less serious offenses, on grounds that
women committing serious crimes depart too far from traditional gender role expectations,
and preferential treatment ceases.”).
71. One possible explanation for these inconsistent results is that less serious offenses
tend to receive more standardized treatment than more serious offenses, making it more
difficult to identify disparities in the former. Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment
Decisions, supra note 42, at 429 (“[M]inor offenses involve a routinization of the criminal
justice process that is ultimately reflected in relatively standardized sentence lengths, while
serious offenses permit more discretion (involve a larger range of possible sentence lengths)
and receive more careful attention to all (including extralegal) aspects of the case.”).
72. See id. at 430 (“[P]roportionate increases in offense seriousness tend to increase the
sentence length for male more so than female defendants.”).
73. Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 415 (finding that gender disparities in charge
reductions “appears to be largely driven by violent and drug offenses”); Spohn & Spears,
supra note 42, at 43 (finding that females received favorable treatment for prosecutors in a set
of violent crimes and that this is also the case for cases involving robberies, a particularly
“masculine” crime according to the authors).
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C. The Intersection of Gender and Race
This Section begins with an overview of the empirical literature that has identified
significant racial disparities in sentencing and plea-bargaining outcomes, followed
by a review of the theoretical work that has attempted to explain these disparities.
The last part of this Section discusses the literature that has examined the intersection
of gender and race in explaining criminal case outcomes.
1. Documenting Racial Disparities
Studies examining criminal case outcomes in federal courts have identified
substantial racial disparities in judges’ sentencing decisions—black defendants are
incarcerated more frequently and receive longer sentences than white defendants. 74
Although fewer studies have analyzed sentencing disparities at the state level, the
evidence suggests that racial disparities in sentencing outcomes also exist at the state
level.75
However, whether the race of the defendant plays a role in the use of prosecutorial
discretion and how prosecutorial discretion may contribute to racial disparities in
sentencing is far from being a settled question. 76 While some studies find that the
race of the defendant has no effect on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
reducing or dismissing charges77 or that prosecutorial discretion is often exercised in

74. E.g., Mustard, supra note 40, at 301, 306 (finding that black and Hispanic defendants
receive substantially longer sentences than white defendants and are also more likely to be
incarcerated); Schanzenbach, supra note 40, at 72–73 (finding that black defendants in federal
criminal cases receive sentences that are 2.9 months higher than white defendants, a difference
that represents six percent of the average sentence of 48.2 months); Darrell Steffensmeier &
Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who Is
Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705, 716 (2000) [hereinafter Steffensmeier &
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing] (documenting similar sentencing disparities).
75. E.g., David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary
in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 356 (2012) (finding that black defendants
in Chicago, Illinois, receive longer sentences and are thirty percent more likely to be
incarcerated than white defendants); Steffensmeier & Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’, supra
note 57, at 160 (finding that white defendants in Pennsylvania are less likely to be incarcerated
than black and Hispanic defendants, and also receive shorter sentences).
76. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra note 37, at 7 (“Overall,
research finds that the effect of race and ethnicity on prosecutorial decision making is
inconsistent . . . .”).
77. E.g., EMILY OWENS, ERIN M. KERRISON & BERNARDO SANTOS DA SILVEIRA,
EXAMINING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES AMONG INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS IN SAN FRANCISCO 9, http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads
/sites/2/2017/06/quattronefullreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LZF7-KJZC]
(finding
no
significant racial disparities in the downgrade of charges after controlling for criminal history
and booking charges); Albonetti, Charge Reduction, supra note 48, at 325–30 (analyzing 400
burglary and robbery cases in Jacksonville, Florida, and finding no evidence of racial
disparities in prosecutors’ decision to reduce initial charges); Franklin, supra note 49, at 697
(finding no effect of race in case dismissals); Rodney Kingsnorth, John Lopez, Jennifer
Wentworth & Debra Cummings, Adult Sexual Assault: The Role of Racial/Ethnic Composition

2019]

GE NDE R DI S PARI TIES IN P LE A BA RGAI NI N G

1263

a manner favorable to black defendants,78 many conclude that there are racial
disparities in the plea-bargaining process disfavoring black defendants. 79 In a recent
study analyzing the dataset employed in this Article, the author documented racial
disparites in charge reduction rates.80
2. Explaining Racial Disparities
The various theories that seek to explain racial disparities in criminal case
outcomes mirror those described earlier in our discussion of gender disparities.
Differences in crime and defendant characteristics across cases involving black and
white defendants could explain disparities in outcomes. For example, if black
defendants have lengthier criminal records and are convicted of more serious
offenses than white defendants, then one would expect the former to receive, on
average, longer sentences.81 Other defendant characteristics, such as age 82 and
gender,83 that impact sentencing and plea-bargaining determinations could also be

in Prosecution and Sentencing, 26 J. CRIM. JUST. 359, 362–65 (1998) (finding no racial
disparities in the in the prosecution and sentencing of cases in a sample of 365 sexual assaults
in Sacramento County, California); Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 415 (finding race
of defendant does not affect likelihood of receiving a charge reduction in charges).
78. See, e.g., Malcolm D. Holmes, Howard C. Daudistel & Ronald A. Farrell,
Determinants of Charge Reductions and Final Dispositions in Cases of Burglary and Robbery,
24 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 233, 242–45 (1987) (finding that black defendants accused
of burglary and robbery offenses in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, are more likely to receive
a charge reduction); Cassia Spohn & Jeffrey Spears, The Effect of Offender and Victim
Characteristics on Sexual Assault Case Processing Decisions, 13 JUST. Q. 649, 661 (1996)
(finding that "likelihood of charge dismissal was significantly greater for cases involving black
offenders and white victims” in a sample of Michigan sexual assault cases); John Wooldredge
& Amy Thistlethwaite, Bilevel Disparities in Court Dispositions for Intimate Assault, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 417, 437–39 (2004) (finding that black offenders are less likely to be charged
and fully prosecuted relative to white offenders in a study of 2948 male arrests for
misdemeanor intimate assaults in Cincinnati, Ohio).
79. E.g., Besiki Luka Kutateladze, Nancy R. Andiloro & Brian D. Johnson, Opening
Pandora’s Box: How Does Defendant Race Influence Plea Bargaining?, 33 JUST. Q. 398, 414
(2016) (finding in a sample of misdemeanor marijuana cases in New York County that black
defendants are less likely than white defendants to be offered a charge reduction); see also
KUTATELADZE ET AL., RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN, supra note 38, at 6 (analyzing
a sample of misdemeanor and felony drug cases in New York City and finding that “[a]lthough
some evidence emerged that black defendants were less likely to receive an offer of a lower
charge than were similarly situated white defendants, this difference was not statistically
significant due to a relatively small sample size.”); Spohn et al., supra note 50, at 183–86
(finding that Hispanic and black males are more likely to be fully prosecuted in a sample of
cases from Los Angeles county).
80. See Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59
B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018).
81. Steffensmeier & Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing, supra note 74, at 716 (finding
that black defendants are convicted of more severe offenses and have lengthier prior records
than white defendants).
82. See supra note 59.
83. See supra Section I.B.1.
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correlated with defendants’ race. However, even after controlling for these defendant
and crime characteristics, a significant black-white gap in sentencing and pleabargaining outcomes remains.84
Another explanation for the observed racial disparities in criminal case outcomes
is that judges and prosecutors may be using a defendant’s race as a proxy for the
defendant’s inherent criminality.85 In that setting, implicit biases can lead judges and
prosecutors to make decisions that systematically discriminate against defendants of
a given race if they ascribe certain characteristics to members of that group.86 In other
words, race, like gender, matters because it is an observable attribute that can be used
by judges and prosecutors (consciously or subconsciously) as a proxy or signal of an
individual’s inherent criminality, the latter being an unobservable attribute. 87
Thus, if judges perceive black defendants as being more dangerous and more
likely to recidivate than white defendants, then black defendants will be incarcerated
more often and receive on average longer sentences than similar white defendants. 88
Similarly, if prosecutors perceive black defendants as being more dangerous and
more likely to recidivate than white defendants, we would expect prosecutors to be
on average more lenient on white defendants relative to black defendants, for
example by agreeing to reduce the top charges faced by white defendants’ more
often.89

84. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. Unobservable crime characteristics
may also be driving these sentencing disparities. The heinousness and other aspects of a crime,
which may be observed by a judge but not a researcher, may affect sentencing decisions. See
Schanzenbach, supra note 40, at 63. However, for this to explain racial disparities in
sentencing, one would need the heinousness of a crime to correlate with the race of the
criminal (i.e., black criminals would need to be more likely to commit a given crime in a more
heinous manner than white criminals).
85. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris
Guthriet, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195,
1197 (2009) (arguing that judges “hold implicit racial biases” and that such biases “can
influence their judgment”). For an overview of the possible sources of implicit racial biases,
see Kang et al., supra note 68, at 1128–35; Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 957–62 (2006), see also
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 969–70
(2006) (providing examples of both explicit and implicit bias).
87. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
88. Albonetti, Judicial Discretion, supra note 66, at 258 (“Increases in sentence severity
produced by the race variable support the causal attribution and uncertainty avoidance
hypothesis linking black defendants with attributions of a high risk of future criminal behavior
and judicial use of discretion as a means to deal with administrative concerns for reducing
such risk.”); Baradaran, supra note 28, at 176–77 (“Criminal justice actors often predict which
defendants are going to commit an additional crime in determining whether to arrest
defendants, to release them on bail, or to release them on parole, or in determining their
sentence. This prediction is often based not only on individual evaluation, but also on a group’s
criminality and past behavior . . . Arguments against prediction include that it . . . allows judges
to inappropriately consider race in determining who will commit an additional crime. In other
words, judges use race as a proxy for risk.”).
89. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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The existence of racial disparities in average charge reduction rates is not the only
prediction that follows from this model. If prosecutors have other salient and easily
accessible information about a defendant’s dangerousness, race should then play a
smaller role as prosecutors have other proxies to employ in their decision-making.90
That is, one would expect the gap in charge reduction rates between white and black
defendants to be smaller when the defendants share a characteristic that is associated
with recidivism, such as a prior criminal record. 91
3. Gender Disparities and the Mediating Role of Race
The discussion so far has focused on two defendant characteristics, race and
gender, that play an important role in shaping criminal case outcomes in federal and
state criminal cases. A number of studies have examined the intersection of these
dimensions by addressing a series of interrelated questions. If female and white
defendants achieve more favorable outcomes, should we expect white female
defendants to have outcomes that are superior to those of other groups (including
white males and black females)?92 Conversely, should we expect male black
defendants to face far worse case outcomes than any other group?93 Are female
offenders, regardless of race, treated more leniently than male offenders? 94 Or do
white female defenders receive more lenient treatment than black female
defenders?95 The answers to these questions hinge on the role of race in mediating
the dynamics underlying the more lenient treatment received by female relative to
male defendants.

90. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
91. In other words, black defendants should receive less “personalized” or
“individualized” treatment—i.e., the differences in charge reductions between black
defendants with and without criminal records will be smaller than the difference in charge
reductions between white defendants with and without criminal records. See Steen et al., supra
note 66, at 461 (“[D]ecision makers do not appear to make sharp distinctions between the most
‘dangerous’ black offenders and most other black offenders . . . Thus, a principal effect of
minority status may be to produce less individualized, more homogenous decision making.”).
Empirical evidence lends support to this prediction. See id. at 460–61 (finding that “the
likelihood of incarceration is virtually certain for both black and white offenders who fit the
stereotype of a dangerous drug offender, but in the less-serious categories . . . judges are less
likely to incarcerate white offenders than their black counterparts”); Berdejó, supra note 80,
at 1191 (finding that racial disparities are greater in cases involving low-level offenses and
defendants with no prior convictions).
92. See Spohn & Beichner, supra note 42, at 167.
93. See Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 34 (noting that a “number of studies have
suggested that discriminatory treatment of criminal defendants may be restricted primarily to
black males, while preferential treatment may be reserved for white females”).
94. See Spohn & Beichner, supra note 42, at 167.
95. See Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, supra note 42, at 429
(“[S]ome writers propose that leniency is directed more toward white than black female
defendants, on grounds that the chivalry and other protections of traditional gender
stereotyping are not accorded to low-income black women, who are overrepresented in court
dockets.”).
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These studies have found that although gender disparities in sentencing are
present when comparing white and black defendants and racial disparities are present
when comparing male and female defendants, gender disparities are greater in the
set of black defendants96 and racial disparities are greater in the subset of female
defendants.97 Together, these two sets of findings suggests that white female
defendants receive the most favorable treatment and that black male defendants
receive the most harsh treatment at the sentencing stage—with black female and
white males somewhere in between.
The evidence presented in studies examining disparities in plea bargaining is
mixed. While some studies uncover evidence suggesting that white female
defendants are treated more leniently by prosecutors than black female defendants, 98
other studies find no significant differences in the treatment received by defendants
in these two groups.99 The evidence also suggests that black male defendants fare
worse than other groups in the plea-bargaining stage of the criminal justice system,
though this is not a universal finding.100
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
The first Section of this Part presents an overview of the legal framework
governing the criminal justice process in Wisconsin, focusing mainly on the
discretion afforded to district attorneys and judges. The second Section describes the
dataset and the construction of the variables used in the empirical analyses presented

96. See, e.g., Spohn & Beichner, supra note 42, at 167 (finding that in Chicago and
Kansas City, black and female defendants are significantly less likely than male defendants to
be sentenced to prison, while in Miami gender disparities are concentrated on the set of black
defendants); Starr, supra note 28, at 152 (finding that racial disparties are larger among black
than nonblack defendants); Steffensmeier & Demuth, Does Gender Modify the Effects of Race,
supra note 42, at 255 (finding that gender disparities in incarceration and sentence length
outcomes is smaller for white defendants and larger for black defendants).
97. Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, supra note 42, at 430
(“[A]mong male defendants, race has a negligible effect on sentence length; among female
defendants, however, black female defendants receive prison sentences that, on average, are
about three months longer than white female defendants.”); Steffensmeier et al., Race, Gender,
and Age in Criminal Sentencing, supra note 42, at 782 (finding that black females offenders
are more likely to be incarcerated and receive longer sentences than white female defendants).
But see Steffensmeier & Demuth, Does Gender Modify the Effects of Race, supra note 42, at
255 (finding that there are no racial disparities in incarceration rates and sentencing for female
defendants, but that disparities do exist for male defendants).
98. See Farnworth & Teske, supra note 52, at 23 (noting a “greater tendency to change
charges of assault to nonassault among white female defendants than among minority
females”).
99. See Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 47–48 (finding that white females are more
likely to have their charges dismissed than white males and black males, but finding no
significant difference between black and white females).
100. See Franklin, supra note 49, at 700 n.10 (“Findings indicated that compared to
Whites, Black males, Black females, Hispanic males, and Hispanic females were no more or
less likely to have their cases dismissed in the present sample.”); Spohn et al., supra note 50,
at 183–85.
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later in the Article. Before proceeding further, it is worth explaining why Wisconsin
was selected as the jurisdiction in which to study gender disparities in the pleabargaining process. The most important reason is the nature of the available data.
Wisconsin courts maintain records that include a comprehensive set of information
for each criminal action, allowing us to follow a case from the initial filing of
charges, through the dismissal or reduction of charges, and up to adjudication and
sentencing.101 Similar databases maintained by other states or the federal government
are far more limited in their scope, often including only cases which resulted in a
conviction and containing only sentencing information. 102
A. Criminal Justice Process in Wisconsin
State circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine all criminal actions
and proceedings in Wisconsin.103 With a few exceptions, each county in the state has
its own circuit court, with the number of branches (or judges)104 varying from circuit
to circuit.105 Circuit court judges are elected at the circuit court level for a term of six
years.106 Similarly, with a few exceptions, each county in the state also encompasses
a prosecutorial unit and elects a district attorney who serves for a term of four
years.107
Charging and plea bargaining decisions are made by the local district attorney
office.108 Prosecutorial discretion in this respect is quite broad so long as the charges
are supported by probable cause. 109 Although judges do review plea bargains, in
practice few agreements are rejected.110 As in other jurisdictions, the minority of
cases which are not resolved via a plea agreement are adjudicated at a bench or jury
trial.111 Once a defendant has been convicted of a particular crime, Wisconsin law
provides the presiding judge ample discretion in choosing the appropriate
sentence.112
Wisconsin does not have a set of sentencing guidelines providing a mandatory or
advisory sentencing range based on the crime committed by the defendant and the
defendant’s criminal history. 113 Moreover, few crimes carry a mandatory minimum

101. See infra Section II.B.2 (presenting an overview of the data analyzed in this Article).
102. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (describing data limitations of existing
studies).
103. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 753.03 (West 2018).
104. See id. § 753.061(1).
105. Id. § 753.06. Dane County, which has its own circuit court, has seventeen branches
(or judges). Id. § 753.06(5)(a).
106. Id. § 753.01.
107. Id. § 978.01. However, for the relevant period (prior to 2008) the term was two years.
Id. § 978.01 (West 2007).
108. MICHAEL M. O’HEAR, SENTENCING POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN WISCONSIN 6–7
(2016).
109. See id. at 7.
110. Id.
111. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.02 (West 2018).
112. See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
113. See O’HEAR, supra note 108, at 1; supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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sentence.114 Most crimes are classified into classes of felonies or misdemeanors, with
each class carrying its own maximum penalty. 115 Currently, there are nine classes of
felony crimes116 and three classes of misdemeanors. 117 Certain statutory provisions
allow for sentencing enhancements which increase the possible maximum sentence
a judge may impose, but these are advisory in nature and not ultimately binding. 118
Except for crimes involving a class A felony, the sentencing judge also has the
discretion to impose probation instead of a sentence carrying an incarceration
term.119 Sentences imposed by judges in Wisconsin are often definitive, as
defendants are required to serve the full term of their sentences without the
possibility of parole or early release due to good behavior. 120
B. Description of the Data
The first part of this Section provides an overview of the dataset used to conduct
the analyses presented later in the Article. The second part describes how the
different variables were constructed.

114. O’HEAR, supra note 108, at 7–8 (noting that few crimes carry a mandatory minimum
and that the most important of these are Class A felonies which carry a mandatory life
sentence).
115. See id.; infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
116. The classes of felony crimes are as follows (with maximum sentences in years in
parenthesis): A (Life), B (60), C (40), D (25), E (15), F (12.5), G (10), H (6), and I (3.5). WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West 2005). Prior to 2002, there were six classes of felonies: A (Life),
B (60), BC (30), C (15), D (10), E (5). WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West 1996). Three new
classes of felony crimes were added as part of a broader reform to the criminal system in 2002.
See 2001 Wis. Sess. Laws 109 §§ 545–59 (amending WIS. STAT. § 939.50). Prior to this reform
a number of drug offenses, among others, had maximum sentences that were set by statute and
not keyed to a class. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41 (West 2007).
117. The three classes of misdemeanor crimes are the following (with maximum sentences
in parenthesis): A (nine months), B (ninety days), and C (thirty days). WIS. STAT. ANN. §
939.51 (West 2005). More generally, misdemeanors are defined as crimes that are not
punishable by imprisonment in a state prison. Id. § 939.60.
118. O’HEAR, supra note 108, at 8. If a defendant is convicted of more than one count that
carries a potential sentence, the judge may impose sentences for each count to be served
concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 7.
119. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3) (West 2005). A judge choosing to impose probation
has wide discretion in structuring a probationary scheme. See O’HEAR, supra note 108, at 9.
120. O’HEAR, supra note 108, at 8; Michael O’Hear, Good Conduct Time for Prisoners:
Why (and How) Wisconsin Should Provide Credits Towards Early Release, 98 MARQ. L. REV.
487, 490 (2014). This applies to all felony offenses committed on or after December 31, 1999.
O’HEAR, supra note 108, at 16. Moreover, although appellate courts review judges’ sentencing
decisions, the process is not very rigorous and seldom leads to the overturning of a sentence.
See Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the
Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 762 (2009); O’HEAR, supra note
108, at 9–11.
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1. Overview of the Database
The data comes from the public records of the Wisconsin circuit courts, which are
available electronically at the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access (WCCA) website.121
This site provides the case information entered into the Consolidated Court
Automation Programs (CCAP) case management system by court staff in the
Wisconsin circuit courts where the files are located.122 The focus of this study will
be those cases labeled as criminal misdemeanors or criminal felonies, 123 which
involve offenses committed after December 31, 1999,124 and adjudicated before
December 31, 2006.125
The analyses presented later in the Article restrict the sample to cases filed and
adjudicated in Dane County. Focusing on a single county is advantageous to the
extent that it helps maintain various factors relating to law enforcement and the
criminal justice system (such as district attorney office and judges) constant. Dane
County, which includes the capital city of Madison, is the second most populous
county in the state after Milwaukee County126 and has a demographic makeup that
reflects that of the state as a whole.127 Moreover, the coding of various variables in
the system’s database are more consistent in Dane County compared to Milwaukee
County.
Cases which were transferred to another county or jurisdiction before adjudication
or that deal with the extradition of a defendant to another state are excluded from the
final dataset. Also excluded are cases that involve defendants which are legal persons

121. Access to the Public Records of the Wisconsin Circuit Courts, WIS. CIR. CT. ACCESS,
https://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl [https://perma.cc/PUV2-TNWM].
122. Case Search, WIS. CIR. CT. ACCESS, https://www.wicourts.gov/casesearch.htm
[https://perma.cc/5S68-7B63]. Some counties started using CCAP during 1991. Dane County
began using the system in January 1995. When Wisconsin Counties Began Using CCAP, WIS.
CIR. CT. ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/counties-on-ccap.html [https://perma.cc/6CVLZK5N]. Several counties, including Dane, have loaded their historical cases to the system,
making them available on the WCCA system. Site Help, WIS. CIR. CT. ACCESS,
https://wcca.wicourts.gov/help.xsl [https://perma.cc/7N4V-TKBW].
123. See Frequently Asked Questions #2k – Could You Describe What The Different Case
Types Mean?, WIS. CIR. CT. ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/faq.xsl#Faq15
[https://perma.cc/6T2R-3RNL].
124. This restriction is imposed so that only cases adjudicated under the Truth in
Sentencing Law are included. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. The Wisconsin circuit courts provided all available information in the CCAP system
for all cases resolved on or before December 31, 2006.
126. As of 2010, Dane County had a population of 488,073, and Milwaukee County had a
population of 947,735. The next most populous county is Waukesha County with 389,891
inhabitants. U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Race Data, Wisconsin County Subdivisions
(Minor Civil Divisions), Census 2000 and 2010 Comparisons, WISCONSIN.GOV
https://doa.wi.gov/pages/SearchResults.aspx?q=%22population%20and%20race%22
[https://perma.cc/56RS-PWGZ].
127. According to the 2010 Census, 86.2% of the Wisconsin population was white. Id.
That number is considerably lower in Milwaukee, where only 60.6% of the population was
white according to census data. Id. In Dane County, on the other hand had, 84.7% of the
population was white. Id.
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(such as businesses) or defendants who were found to not be mentally competent. To
better capture the effect of plea bargaining, the final sample also excludes cases in
which none of the initial charges carried a potential jail or prison sentence, cases
which were adjudicated in a trial, cases in which all charges were dismissed before
the defendant’s initial appearance, and cases in which the highest charge was
dismissed by the court by the defendant’s motion or on its own. As customary in the
literature examining gender disparities, cases involving offenses that are
disproportionally committed by male offenders, namely, those in which less than five
percent of offenders were females, are also excluded.128
The final dataset contains 46,150 cases. Of these, 15,861 cases included at least a
felony crime as part of the initial charges, while the remaining 30,289 cases involved
misdemeanor charges. A total of 9896 cases (or 21.44% of the entire sample) involve
female defendants.129
2. Construction of the Variables
The data made available by the CCAP is quite detailed. One file of the dataset
provides demographical information on the defendant, including the defendant’s
name, gender, race, and date of birth. This information was used to create variables
for the defendant’s gender,130 age,131 and race.132 One key variable not directly
contained in the dataset is the criminal history of the defendant. However, the fact
that the data contains the full name and date of birth of the defendant allows us to
generate a variable to measure a defendant’s criminal history. Using the defendant
information dataset together with the judgment disposition dataset133 one can

128. See Spohn & Spears, supra note 42, at 34; Starr, supra note 28, at 132–33. This
excludes a total of 1367 cases involving the following offenses: Kidnap/Hostage (W IS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 940.30–.31 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018), 383 cases, 2.87% female), Other Crimes
Against Children (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.07–.1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018), 129 cases,
3.88% female), Sex Registry Violation (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018),
185 cases, 1.08% female), Sexual Assault of a Child (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.02 (West 2005
& Supp. 2018), 239 cases, 2.09% female), Sexual Assault of a Child - Repeated (WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 948.025 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018), 90 cases, 2.22% female), and Sexual Assault
(WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018). 341 cases, 1.76% female).
129. The relative proportion of male and female defendants is similar to that in the two
most recent studies examining gender disparities in plea bargaining. See Shermer & Johnson,
supra note 34, at 412 (14% of cases involve female defendants); Starr, supra note 28, at 132–
33 (19.2% of cases involve female defendants).
130. The variable Female is an indicator variable equal to one if a defendant’s gender is
coded in CCAP as female and zero if the defendant’s gender is coded as male.
131. The variable Age is constructed by subtracting the defendant’s year of birth from the
year in which the case was originally filed. For cases missing a defendant’s age, the average
age in the sample is imputed.
132. Defendants were divided into three groups based on the race description provided in
the CCAP data: (1) white, (2) black, and (3) other. This last group includes defendants of other
races as well as defendants for whom race information was not available.
133. That dataset contains sentencing information for those cases in which a defendant was
convicted of at least one of the charges filed against him or her. Records relating to offenses
committed before the year 2000 were also employed to measure the prior criminal record of
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calculate the number of times a defendant had been convicted prior to the
adjudication of a given case.134
The database also contains detailed information for each individual charge in a
case, including the initial crime a defendant was charged with, as well as the crime
with which that defendant was ultimately charged. For each final charge the dataset
contains information on its final adjudication—whether it was dismissed, whether
the defendant pleaded guilty or no contest, or whether the defendant was found guilty
or innocent at trial. Another dataset contains the sentencing information for those
charges for which defendants were convicted, namely, whether the defendant was
given a jail or prison sentence (and the number of months), whether the defendant
was put on probation, or whether the defendant was assessed a monetary penalty.
For each case, I collect information on the initial set of charges: the highest crime
class (i.e., the highest possible sentence for all charges) 135 and the type of crime
corresponding to the principal initial charge, 136 as well as a general count of the
number of felony and misdemeanor offenses the defendant was initially charged
with. The same information is recorded for the final set of charges for which the
defendant was convicted—namely, the highest crime class, the type of crime
associated with the main conviction offense, the number of charges by crime class
group, as well as a general count of the number of felony and misdemeanor
convictions. Finally, I record the highest sentence received by the defendant for all
charges. Different outcome and control variables are then constructed based on these
variables, all of which are described in more detail in the discussion of the results
presented in the next part.
III. RESULTS
The first Section of this Part explores gender disparities in plea-bargaining
outcomes. The results reveal that female defendants are more likely than male
defendants to see their initial top charges reduced and dropped during this process.
Notably, gender disparities are greater in cases involving lower-level offenses and
defendants with no prior convictions. Building on these findings, the second section

defendants.
134. Defendants were matched according to first name, last name, and month and year of
birth to create a unique identifier. For each case in the dataset, the following two variables
were generated: (i) Prior1, an indicator variable equal to one if the defendant had one prior
conviction, and (ii) Prior2+, an indicator variable equal to one if the defendant had two or
more prior convictions. Defendants with no prior convictions are coded with a zero in both of
these indicator variables. This method of calculating this variable is certainly not precise. One
concern is that of false positives—if two individuals have the same name and date of birth,
then the number of priors for these individuals will be artificially inflated. It is worth noting
that the nature of the sample (i.e., just individuals charged with a crime) reduces the likelihood
of such false positives occurring. Moreover, for these false positives to bias the results, one
would need such false positives to be systematically correlated with the gender of the
defendant.
135. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
136. This set of crime categories is based on the corresponding chapter of the Wisconsin
criminal code. For a list of these categories see Appendix Table 2.
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of this Part explores the intersection of gender and race in the plea-bargaining
process. These results indicate that white female defendants are treated more
leniently than other groups by prosecutors and that black male defendants receive
the least favorable treatment.
A. Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining
The first part of this Section explores gender disparities in the plea-bargaining
process. To measure such disparities, we can compare the rates at which different
defendants plead guilty to the initial principal charge, or conversely, the rates at
which different defendants end up pleading guilty to a reduced charge. 137 Such
charge reduction is one of the most important outcomes in plea bargaining as
sentence length is often determined by the severity of the crime of which the
defendant is ultimately convicted.138 The main results indicate that female defendants
are significantly more likely than male defendants to receive a charge reduction, even
after controlling for a number of defendant and case characteristics. 139
The second and third parts of this Section examine how gender disparities in
charge reduction rates vary according to the severity of the offense and the
defendant’s criminal history, respectively. The results suggest that gender disparities
are greater in low-information cases (i.e., cases involving low-level offenses or
defendants with no prior convictions), raising the possibility that a defendant’s
gender may be being used as a proxy of his or her inherent criminality. 140 The fourth
part of this Section briefly examines disparities in the stage that follows the pleabargaining process (i.e., sentencing) to verify whether gender disparities in charge
reduction are being corrected in later stages.
1.

Gender Disparities in Charge Reductions
a. Baseline Results

Generally, female defendants see their top charge dropped or amended to a lesser
charge in 47.48% of the cases, while the charge reduction rate for male defendants
is considerably lower, 39.91%.141 That is, female defendants are approximately 20%
more likely to have their top charge dropped or reduced than male defendants.142
Though informative, merely comparing raw averages can be deceiving, as several

137. This follows Shermer and Johnson who define their charge reduction outcome as a
reduction in the statutory maximum between the filing offense and the offense of conviction.
Shermer & Johnson, supra note 34, at 408. Following Shermer and Johnson, for cases
involving multiple charges and concurrent sentences the statutory maximum for the most
serious charge (i.e., that with the highest statutory maximum) is used. Id.
138. See Wright & Engen, supra note 36, at 9.
139. See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 70–73; infra notes 167–68, 185–86 and accompanying text.
141. See infra Figure 1.
142. This relative difference is calculated by dividing the difference in charge reduction
rates between female and male defendants (7.6 percentage points) by the charge reduction
rates of male defendants (39.9 percentage points), which yields nineteen percent.

2019]

GE NDE R DI S PARI TIES IN P LE A BA RGAI NI N G

1273

factors affect prosecutorial decision-making. For example, the type and severity of
the crime, the number of concurrent charges, and the defendant’s criminal history all
play a role in plea-bargaining determinations.143 Moreover, other demographic
characteristics of defendants, such as age and race, are correlated with criminal case
outcomes, including charge reductions.144 One concern is that male defendants are
more likely than female defendants to exhibit those characteristics and commit those
types of crimes associated with less favorable criminal case outcomes.145

Figure 1. Charge Reduction Rates by Gender
50.00%
48.00%

47.48%

46.00%
44.00%
42.00%
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40.00%
38.00%
36.00%
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To assess gender disparities in the plea-bargaining process more rigorously, we
can estimate a series of probit models in which the outcome variable is a binary
indicator variable equal to one if the top charge in a case was reduced and zero if the
top charge was not reduced.146 A probit model provides an estimate of the probability
of observing a charge reduction in a particular case given a set of defendant and
crime characteristics.147 For each case i, suppose that Vi equals one for those cases

143. See supra notes 57–81 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
145. For example, if male defendants are more likely to be black than female defendants
or are on average younger than female defendants, then some of the difference captured in the
earlier analyses may be attributed to those “hidden” characteristics. Similarly, if male
defendants are convicted of more serious crimes than female defendants, then it should not be
surprising to find that male defendants are incarcerated more often and receive on average
longer sentences.
146. For a discussion of the probit model and other models for binary outcome variables
see ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS
IN THE LAW 298–304 (2d ed. 2016); JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY
ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 96–97, 582–95 (3d ed. 2006); Shima Baradaran &
Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 531–35 (2012).
147. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 146, at 532 (using a similar probit model to
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in which a defendant received a charge reduction and zero for all those cases in which
the defendant did not receive a charge reduction. The goal is to model how different
factors affect the probability of Vi equaling one. A probit estimates a model of a
latent (unobservable) index variable, yi, that is greater than zero for those cases in
which a defendant receives a charge reduction and negative for those cases in which
the defendant does not receive a charge reduction. 148 We can model the latent
variable yi as follows:
yi = α + β1*Female + β2*Xji + β3*Zji + ε i

(1)

In this specification, Femalei is an indicator variable equal to one if the
defendant’s gender was coded as female. 149 The vector Xji contains an additional set
of defendant controls, including (i) the race of the defendant, 150 (ii) the age of the
defendant,151 and (iii) the defendant’s prior criminal history. 152 The vector Zji
contains a set of crime and case characteristics, including (i) Concurrenti, which is
equal to one if the defendant was charged with more than one crime; (ii) MaxSentji,
a set of fixed effects for the statutory maximum sentence corresponding to the
principal initial charge, namely, the charge carrying the highest possible sentence;153
(iii) CrimeDescji, a set of fixed effects controlling for the type of crime involved in
the defendant’s principal charge;154 and (iv) Yearji, a set of fixed effects for the year
in which each case was initially filed. Finally,  i is a mean-zero stochastic error
term.155
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the estimates of the marginal effects for the
explanatory variables in the baseline probit model.156 The coefficient on the indicator

estimate the probability of an individual being rearrested as a function of several variables).
148. In other words, yi is a continuous theoretical approximation of the probability of
observing the outcome Vi. See id.
149. See supra notes 83, 130 and accompanying text.
150. Blacki is an indicator variable equal to one if the defendant’s race was coded as
African-American, while Otheri is an indicator variable equal to one if the defendant was
coded as a race other than African-American or Caucasian. Thus, in these models, white
defendants (i.e., Caucasian) are the omitted race group.
151. See supra notes 59, 131 and accompanying text. To account for a nonlinear
relationship between age and the probability of receiving a charge reduction, the model
includes the quadratic term for age (i.e., Age2i) in addition to a linear term (i.e., Agei).
152. See supra notes 57, 134 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. All results presented in this Article are
robust to using the applicable maximum statutory sentence as a linear control instead of as a
fixed effect.
154. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
155. Unless otherwise noted, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used in
calculating the statistical significance of coefficients of all regressions estimated in this
Article.
156. These marginal effects indicate how the probability of the outcome variable (i.e.,
likelihood of receiving a charge reduction) varies when the value of a given explanatory
variable changes, holding all other variables constant. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 146, at
585–86. For example, the marginal effects of the indicator variable Female tells us how the
probability of the defendant being incarcerated changes if we were to switch the gender of the
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variable Female measures the effect of gender in the probability of a defendant
receiving a charge reduction, holding constant all other defendant and crime
characteristics. The results confirm the gender disparities documented earlier: female
defendants are 5.8 percentage points more likely than male defendants to receive a
charge reduction, a statistically significant difference that represents fourteen percent
of the average charge reduction rate in the sample.157
Table 1. Baseline Estimates & Robustness Checks

Female

Black

Other Race

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Baseline

Interaction

Alt. Crime
Control

Def. Atty.

Pros. Atty.

0.058***

0.055***

0.058***

0.071***

0.063***

[0.006]

[0.008]

[0.006]

[0.006]

[0.010]

-0.068***

-0.067***

-0.069***

-0.042***

-0.069***

[0.005]

[0.006]

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.006]

-0.036***

-0.033***

-0.018*

-0.034***

[0.010]

[0.010]

[0.010]

[0.008]

Fem*Black

-0.008
[0.012]
-0.245***

-0.239***

-0.245***

-0.235***

-0.245***

[0.006]

[0.006]

[0.006]

[0.006]

[0.011]

-0.328***

-0.325***

-0.330***

-0.307***

-0.327***

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.005]

[0.009]

-0.039

-0.040

-0.063

-0.035

-0.036

[0.0506]

[0.051]

[0.0556]

[0.0504]

[0.030]

Obs.

46,140

43,121

46,090

46,140

46,140

Mean

0.415

0.413

0.415

0.415

0.415

Prior (1)

Prior (2+)

Felony

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%). This table presents the marginal effects from probit
models in which the outcome variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
initial top charge in a case was dropped, amended to a lesser charge, or dismissed.
For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see Appendix Table 1.
Unless otherwise noted below, all regressions also include a set of crime class fixed
effects, a set of crime type fixed effects, a set of year fixed effects, and controls for
the defendant’s age. Column (3) replaces the set of crime class fixed effects and the
set of crime type fixed effects with a set of crime class and crime type interactions.
See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. Column (4) includes a set of defense

defendant from male to female, holding all other case and defendant characteristics constant.
157. See infra Table 1, column (1).
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attorney fixed effects. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. Column (5)
includes a set of prosecuting attorney fixed effects and estimates robust standard
errors clustered at the prosecuting attorney level. See supra notes 161–63 and
accompanying text.
b. Omitted Variables and Robustness Checks
One concern with the baseline result presented above is that there might be
relevant factors that affect the probability of a defendant receiving a charge reduction
which are not being controlled for and that are also correlated with the defendant’s
gender. If such a relevant factor is omitted, the econometric model may compensate
for this omission by giving more weight (i.e., ascribe a higher explanatory value) to
a variable that is included in the analysis and that is correlated with the missing
variable.158 This Section explores three such possible omitted factors: the nature of
the offense, the identity of the prosecuting attorney, and the identity of the defense
attorney. These robustness checks reassure us that these omitted variables are not
driving the baseline result.
i. Granular Controls for Crime Type and Severity
One concern is that the crime type controls are too broad, raising the possibility
that the gender of the defendant may be correlated with the severity of the offense
within each crime type category.159 Although the empirical model also controls for
crime class and severity (i.e., by including fixed effects for the statutory maximum
sentence), the inclusion of both variables might not fully address this problem. As a
robustness check, one can instead create alternative controls based on the interaction
of the type of crime (e.g., Robbery) and its class (e.g., 720, 480, and 180 months).
This measure, for example, would yield three different groups for Robbery crimes,
each associated with a different class (or statutory maximum). Including these
alternative crime controls instead of the two complementary sets of crime type and
crime severity controls described earlier does not affect the baseline results presented
above.160
ii. Differences in Prosecuting Attorneys
If prosecutors differ in their willingness to agree to a charge reduction and cases
are not effectively allocated randomly across prosecutors, one may be concerned that
the gender disparities documented earlier are the result of the assignment of cases
involving male defendants to prosecutors that are less likely to agree to charge
reductions. If this is true, then the coefficient on the female indicator variable would

158. For a discussion of this issue see WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 146, at 96–97.
159. For example, male defendants may be more likely to be charged with first-degree
robberies, while female defendants are more likely to be charged with lesser degrees of that
crime.
160. See supra Table 1, column (3). The coefficient on the Female indicator variable is
identical to that of the baseline specification.
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be capturing some of these systematic differences across prosecutors, thus artificially
inflating the magnitude of the observed gender disparities. 161
To address these concerns, we can use the identity of the prosecuting attorney,
which the CCAP database provides for all but 205 of the 46,150 cases in the sample.
Thirty-three prosecutors appear in at least 100 cases. Using this information, we can
construct 35 indicator variables: (i) one indicator variable for each of the 33
prosecutors that appear in at least 100 cases; (ii) one indicator variable for cases
involving prosecutors that appeared less than 100 times in the dataset; and (iii) one
indicator variable for cases in which the identity of the prosecutor was not available.
To verify whether systematic differences in the identity of the prosecutor are driving
gender disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes, we can include these additional
indicator variables in equation (1).162 The baseline result is robust to the inclusion of
these additional controls.163
iii. Differences in Attorney Quality
Another possible explanation for the gender disparities in plea-bargaining
outcomes documented earlier is that there are systematic differences in the quality of
the legal representation of male and female defendants. If more qualified and
experienced attorneys negotiate superior terms for their clients during the pleabargaining process and female defendants have on average better legal representation
than male defendants, then one would expect female defendants to have a higher rate
of charge reductions than male defendants. 164 In that case, the coefficient on the
female indicator variable would be capturing differences in attorney quality.

161. Moreover, cases assigned to the same prosecutor are not necessarily independent of
one another, which can result in artificially deflated standard errors that make results appear
statistically significant when they might not be.
162. To correct for the fact that cases managed by the same prosecutor are not independent
from one another, as part of this robustness check, standard errors are clustered at the
prosecutor level. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and
Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2004) (explaining how clustering of standard error
addresses this issue).
163. See supra Table 1, column (5). The coefficient on the Female variable indicates that
female defendants are 6.3 percentage points more likely than male defendants to receive a
charge reduction, a difference that represents just over fifteen percent of the average charge
reduction rate in the sample.
164. The quality of legal representation for male defendants could be different from that
of female defendants if the former have to rely on public defenders or legal defense funds and
the latter are able to afford private defense attorneys. See Schanzenbach, supra note 40, at 63
(“Both income and assets are determinants of quality of legal counsel and hence will play a
role in sentencing, offense level determination, and probability of a downward departure.”).
However, the existing evidence does not necessarily support this assumption. Although more
experienced counsel seem to obtain better sentencing outcomes for their clients, studies that
have examined how public defenders perform relative to private counsel have reached
inconsistent conclusions. See David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw:
Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1150
(2007) (finding that defendants represented by more experienced public defenders are less
likely to plea to the most serious charge and be incarcerated); Nadine Frederique, Patricia
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The dataset allows us to partially rule out the possibility that such systematic
differences in legal representation are driving the observed disparities. The name of
the defense attorney is available for 41,524 of the 46,150 cases.165 Ninety defense
attorneys appear in at least 100 cases in the database and, in the aggregate, comprise
a total 34,873 observations. Using this information, one can construct a series of (i)
90 indicator variables for each of these 90 defense attorneys, (ii) one indicator
variable for the 6651 cases involving attorneys that appear less than 100 times, and
(iii) one indicator variable for the 4626 cases for which no defense attorney
information was available. To verify whether the identity of the defense attorney is
driving the racial disparities in plea-bargaining outcomes documented earlier, we can
reestimate equation (1) but include the set of 92 defense attorney indicator variables
described above. The baseline result is robust to the inclusion of these additional
controls.166
2. Charge Reductions and Crime Severity
The empirical and theoretical literature examining gender disparities in criminal
case outcomes suggests that offense severity mediates gender disparities.167
According to one strand of this literature, female defendants are afforded more
lenient treatment for low-level offenses, but are afforded similar treatment to that of
male defendants in cases involving more serious offenses in which gender-based
attributions about a defendant’s inherent criminality are less compelling. 168 This

Joseph & R. Christopher C. Hild, What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense
Nationwide? A Brief Overview and Suggestions for Future Research, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1317,
1327 (2014) (“Several studies found that private attorneys are able to obtain better sentencing
outcomes for their clients when compared to public counsel. However, a competing line of
research noted that public defender systems are able to achieve very similar outcomes to
private attorneys.”); Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, An Empirical
Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent”, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 230 (2005) (finding that “public defenders achieved worse sentence
outcomes for their clients than private defense counsel”); Michael A. Roach, Indigent Defense
Counsel, Attorney Quality, and Defendant Outcomes, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 577, 578 (2014)
(finding that “assigned counsel generate significantly less favorable defendant outcomes than
public defenders”); Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent
Defense Counsel 28–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007)
(finding that public defenders outperform assigned private attorneys in federal criminal cases).
165. For cases involving more than one attorney, I selected the attorney who was active
(i.e., had not withdrawn) as of the date in which the case was resolved. When more than one
attorney was active as of this date, I selected the attorney based on alphabetical ordering. In
2264 cases only the name of the attorney’s organization was available—Legal Defense
Program in 1840 cases and State Public Defender in 424 cases. I treated these organizations
as the attorney of record.
166. See supra Table 1, column (4). The coefficient on the Female variable indicates that
female defendants are 7.1 percentage points more likely than male defendants to receive a
charge reduction, a difference that represents just over seventeen percent of the average charge
reduction rate in the sample.
167. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
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Section examines whether crime severity mediates gender disparities by examining
gender disparities in different subsets of cases grouped by the severity of the
corresponding offense.
Table 2. Charge Reduction Rates & Crime Severity
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Misdemeanor Cases

(5)

(6)

Felony Cases

All

Low
(≤ 6 mo)

High
(> 6 mo)

All

Low
(≤ 10 yr)

High
(> 10 yr)

Female

47.81%

52.11%

46.12%

46.79%

50.80%

34.99%

Male

37.37 %

36.52%

37.70%

44.64%

46.85%

37.32%

Note: All columns present the percentage of cases in which the initial top charge
was dropped, amended to a lower charge, or dismissed. Column (1) includes all
misdemeanor cases and column (4) includes all felony cases. Columns (2) and (3)
divide misdemeanor cases based on whether the principal charge carried a potential
sentence of (i) six months or less or (ii) more than six months, respectively. Columns
(5) and (6) divide felony cases based on whether the principal charge carried a
potential sentence of (i) ten years or less or (ii) more than ten years,
respectively.Table 2 presents average charge reduction rates for male and female
defendants in cases involving misdemeanors and felony offenses. In cases involving
misdemeanor offenses, female defendants receive a charge reduction 47.81% of the
time, a rate that is 10.44 percentage points greater than that of males. 169 In other
words, female defendants in misdemeanor cases are 27.94% more likely than male
defendants to receive a charge reduction.170 If we focus on cases involving felony
offenses, gender disparities in charge reductions are considerably smaller.171 In this
set of cases, the difference in charge reduction rates between male and female
defendants, 2.15 percentage points, represents just 4.82% of the charge reduction
rate for male defendants.172 Thus, it appears that the gender disparities in charge
reduction rates identified above are mainly driven by cases in which a misdemeanor
crime was the top charge. Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of this difference
in gender disparities in charge reduction rates across misdemeanor and felony cases.

169. See supra Table 2, column (1).
170. Such charge reductions at the misdemeanor level can be especially valuable to a
defendant to the extent that these may eliminate the possibility of a misdemeanor conviction
(thus precluding the possibility of incarceration) either by the dismissal of all charges or their
reduction to a lesser offense that does not carry a prison sentence (such as a forfeiture).
171. Charge reductions at the felony level can be valuable to defendants not just because
of the corresponding reduction in the maximum possible sentence they may receive later in
the process, but also because of the possibility of having felony charges reduced to
misdemeanor charges. Wright & Engen, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that the reduction of felony
charges to misdemeanors is especially consequential because it reduces punishment and
offender’s criminal history).
172. See supra Table 2, column (4).
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Figure 2. Charge Reductions & Crime Severity
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Felony crimes as a class includes a very diverse group of offenses. Some felonies
are associated with penalties of just over a year in prison, while others carry potential
sentences of up to sixty years or even life imprisonment. 173 To explore these
variations in gender disparities more closely, we can divide felony cases into two
groups according to the severity of the crime involved—whether the maximum
statutory sentence corresponding to the principal charge is (i) greater than ten years
or (ii) ten years or lower.
In cases involving lower-level felonies, female defendants receive charge
reductions 50.80% of the time while male defendants receive charge reductions
46.85% of the time.174 This difference in charge reduction rates, 3.95 percentage
points, represents 8.43% of the average charge reduction rate of male defendants.
The results are strikingly different if we look at cases involving the most serious
felonies. In this set of cases, the charge reduction for male defendants (37.32%) is
higher than the charge reduction rate for female defendants (34.99%).175
Dividing misdemeanor cases according to the severity of the offense reveals a
similar pattern. In cases involving misdemeanors punishable by up to six months
imprisonment, female defendants receive charge reductions 52.11% of the time
while male defendants receive charge reductions 36.52% of the time. 176 Gender
disparities are slightly lower if we look at cases involving misdemeanors punishable
by more than a six-month imprisonment: the charge reduction for female defendants
is 46.12%, while that of male defendants is 37.70%.177

173. See supra note 116.
174. See supra Table 2, column (5).
175. See supra Table 2, column (6).
176. See supra Table 2, column (2). The difference in charge reduction rates, 15.59
percentage points, represents 42.69% of the average charge reduction rate of male defendants.
177. See supra Table 2, column (3). The difference in charge reduction rates, 8.42
percentage points, represents 22.33% of the average charge reduction rate of male defendants.
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These results are consistent with the “bad woman” hypothesis, which predicts that
female defendants committing less serious offenses receive more favorable treatment
relative to male defendants but that female defendants committing more serious
offenses receive similar treatment to male defendants.178 However, as noted earlier,
merely comparing reduction rates can be deceiving as various factors, such as crime
and defendant characteristics, that affect prosecutorial decision-making may be
correlated with defendants’ gender. To control for such factors, we can estimate the
probit model described earlier179 separately for cases involving different offense
seriousness levels. The results of these different probit models, which are presented
in Table 3, confirm that the magnitude of gender disparities is correlated with the
severity of the offense.
Table 3. Charge Reduction Rates & Crime Severity
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Misdemeanor Cases

Female

Black

Other Race

Prior (1)

Prior (2+)

(6)

Felony Cases

All

Low

High

All

Low

High

0.076***

0.092***

0.069***

0.014

0.024*

-0.009

[0.007]

[0.014]

[0.009]

[0.011]

[0.013]

[0.021]

-0.081***

-0.075***

-0.085***

-0.043***

-0.054***

-0.019

[0.006]

[0.012]

[0.007]

[0.009]

[0.011]

[0.0181]

-0.042***

-0.012

-0.053***

-0.006

-0.039*

0.077**

[0.011]

[0.023]

[0.013]

[0.020]

[0.023]

[0.039]

-0.266***

-0.249***

-0.272***

-0.173***

-0.183***

-0.156***

[0.006]

[0.012]

[0.007]

[0.012]

[0.014]

[0.021]

-0.351

***

-0.375

***

-0.342

***

-0.254

***

-0.276

***

-0.199***

[0.006]

[0.011]

[0.007]

[0.010]

[0.012]

[0.018]

-0.015**

-0.053***

-0.008

-0.110***

-0.142***

-0.051***

[0.007]

[0.018]

[0.008]

[0.010]

[0.012]

[0.017]

Obs.

30,279

8,605

21,672

15,861

12,100

3,758

Mean

0.397

0.400

0.396

0.451

0.476

0.369

ConcChrg

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%). This table presents the marginal effects from probit
models in which the outcome variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
initial top charge in a case was dropped, amended to a lesser charge, or dismissed.
Column (1) includes all misdemeanor cases and column (4) includes all felony cases.

178. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
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Columns (2) and (3) divide misdemeanor cases based on whether the principal
charge carried a potential sentence of (i) six months or less or (ii) more than six
months, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) divide felony cases based on whether the
principal charge carried a potential sentence of (i) ten years or less or (ii) more than
ten years, respectively. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see
Appendix Table 1. All regressions also include a set of crime class fixed effects, a
set of crime type fixed effects, a set of year fixed effects, and controls for the
defendant’s age.
In misdemeanor cases, female defendants are 7.6 percentage points more likely
than male defendants to receive a charge reduction, a statistically significant
difference that represents 19.14% of the average charge reduction rate in
misdemeanor cases.180 On the other hand, if we focus on felony cases, the coefficient
on the Female indicator variable is small and not statistically significant. 181 Within
misdemeanor and felony cases, there is a similar negative correlation between gender
disparities and the severity of the offense. Female defendants in low-level
misdemeanor cases are 9.2 percentage points more likely than male defendants to
receive a charge reduction, while in high-level misdemeanor cases the difference in
charge reduction rates between male and female defendants is 6.9 percentage
points.182 In low-level felony cases, female defendants are 2.4 percentage points
more likely than male defendants to receive a charge reduction, a difference that
represents 5.04% of the charge reduction rate in this subset of cases and is of
marginal statistical significance.183 For high-level felony cases, the coefficient on the
Female indicator variable is actually negative and statistically indistinguishable from
zero.184
3. Charge Reductions and Defendant’s Criminal History
The gender attribution theory discussed earlier suggests that the gender of the
defendant should be a less reliable proxy for a defendant’s inherent criminality when
a defendant has been previously convicted.185 Consequently, one may expect gender
disparities to be lower in cases involving defendants with at least one prior conviction
and higher for cases involving defendants with no prior convictions.186 The data
confirms this hypothesis.

180. See supra Table 3, column (1).
181. See supra Table 3, column (4). In felony cases, female defendants are just 1.4
percentage points more likely than male defendants to receive a charge reduction, a difference
representing 3.10% of the average charge reduction rate in felony cases.
182. See supra Table 3, columns (2), (3).
183. See supra Table 3, column (5).
184. See supra Table 3, column (6).
185. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Table 4. Charge Reduction Rates & Criminal History
(1)

(2)
All

(3)

(4)

(5)

Misdemeanors

(6)

Felonies

No Prior

Prior

No Prior

Prior

No Prior

Prior

Female

64.42%

28.50%

65.42%

25.06%

61.77%

34.36%

Male

57.95%

29.79%

57.01%

24.57%

60.28%

38.10%

Note: All columns present the percentage of cases in which the initial top charge
was dropped, amended to a lower charge, or dismissed. Columns (1) and (2) include
all cases, while columns (3)–(4) and columns (5)–(6) include all misdemeanor and
felony cases, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) restrict the sample to cases in
which the defendant had no prior convictions, while columns (2), (4), and (6) restrict
the sample to cases in which the defendant had at least a prior conviction.
Female defendants with no prior convictions receive charge reductions in 64.42%
of the cases, 6.47 percentage points higher than the rate of charge reductions for male
defendants with no prior convictions, 57.95%.187 In other words, female defendants
with no prior convictions are 11.16% more likely than male defendants to receive a
charge reduction. On the other hand, female defendants with at least one prior
conviction are 1.29 percentage points less likely than male defendants with at least
one prior conviction to receive a charge reduction. 188 Figure 3 presents a graphical
illustration of this relationship between defendants’ criminal history and gender
disparities in charge reduction.

187. See supra Table 4, column (1).
188. See supra Table 4, column (2). In other words, female defendants are 4.3% less likely
than male defendants to receive a charge reduction. This difference, however, is not
statistically significant.
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Figure 3. Charge Reductions & Criminal
History
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This pattern of gender disparities favoring females with no prior convictions is
consistent across both felony and misdemeanor crimes, though in notably different
ways. Female defendants charged with misdemeanors who have no prior criminal
history are 8.41 percentage points more likely than similarly situated male
defendants to see their top charges dropped or reduced.189 Differences in charge
reduction rates between male and female defendants in misdemeanor cases are
substantially smaller if we only consider defendants who have at least one prior
conviction. In these cases, females are just 0.49 percentage points more likely than
male defendants to receive a charge reduction.190
Female defendants with no prior convictions see their top felony charges reduced
61.77% of the time, while male defendants do so 60.28% of time, a difference of
1.49 percentage points.191 However, gender disparities reverse when we look at
defendants with at least one prior conviction that have been charged with at least one
felony. In this subset of cases male defendants are more likely to receive charge
reductions than female defendants. The charge reduction rate for male defendants in
these cases (38.10%) is 3.74 percentage points greater than that of female defendants
(34.36%).192

189. See supra Table 4, column (3). In these cases, female defendants see their top charges
reduced 65.42% of the time, while male defendants do so 57.01% of the time. This difference
of 8.41 percentage points represents 14.75% of the charge reduction rate for male defendants.
190. See supra Table 4, column (4). In these cases, female defendants see their top charges
reduced 25.06% of the time, while male defendants do so 24.57% of the time. This difference
of 0.49 percentage points represents 1.99% of the charge reduction rate for male defendants.
191. See supra Table 4, column (5). This difference of 1.49 percentage points represents
2.47% of the charge reduction rate for male defendants.
192. See supra Table 4, column (6). This difference of 3.74 percentage points represents
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In other words, gender disparities in misdemeanor cases reverse by 7.92
percentage points as we move from defendants with no prior convictions (where
female charge reduction rates are 8.41 percentage points higher) to defendants with
at least one prior conviction (where female charge reduction rates are just 0.49
percentage points higher). Similarly, gender disparities in felony cases reverse by
5.23 percentage points as we move from defendants with no prior convictions (where
female charge reduction rates are 1.49 percentage points higher) to defendants with
at least one prior conviction (where female charge reduction rates are 3.74 percentage
points lower). Figure 4 presents a graphical illustration of these patterns in gender
disparities.

Figure 4. Interaction of Crime Severity & Criminal
History
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%

No Prior

Prior

Misdemeanors

No Prior

Prior
Felonies

To control for various factors that affect prosecutors’ plea-bargaining decisions,
we can reestimate the baseline probit model on separate subsets of the cases based
on defendants’ criminal histories.193 The results are consistent with those described
just above—there are significant disparities in the rate of charge reductions favoring
female defendants over male defendants who have no prior criminal records, but the
disparities between these two groups decrease significantly (and even reverse) when
the analyses focus solely on defendants with at least a prior conviction.194 This is true

10.88% of the charge reduction rate for female defendants.
193. See supra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
194. Female defendants with no prior convictions are 9.2 percentage points more likely
than male defendants to receive a charge reduction, a difference that represents 15.38% of the
average reduction rate. See infra Table 5, column (1). On the other hand, when we look at
cases in which the defendant had prior convictions, the coefficient on Female is smaller
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for cases in which the top charge was a misdemeanor 195 and in cases in which the top
charge was a felony.196

(0.012), which represents just 4.05% of the average reduction rate and is not statistically
significant. See infra Table 5, column (2).
195. Female defendants with no prior convictions who are initially charged with
misdemeanors are 10.8 percentage points more likely than male defendants to receive a charge
reduction. See infra Table 5, column (3). The coefficient on Female represents 18.15% of the
average reduction rate in this sample of cases. See infra Table 5, column (3). On the other
hand, when we look at misdemeanor cases in which the defendant had prior convictions, the
coefficient on Female is substantially smaller (0.023) and represents 9.31% of the mean
outcome. See infra Table 5, column (4).
196. In felony cases, female defendants with no prior convictions are 3.7 percentage points
more likely than male defendants to obtain a charge reduction, a difference that represents
6.10% of the average rate in this sample of cases. See infra Table 5, column (5). However,
there is no statistically significant difference between the rates of charge reduction for male
and female defendants with prior criminal history. See infra Table 5, column (6). The
coefficient on Female is small (-0.007) and represents 1.87% of the mean outcome in this
subset of cases. See infra Table 5, column (6).
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Table 5. Charge Reduction Rates & Criminal History
(1)

(2)
All Cases

Female

Black

Other Race

(4)

(5)

Misdemeanor Cases

(6)
Felony Cases

No Prior

Prior

No Prior

Prior

No Prior

Prior

0.092***

0.012

0.108***

0.023**

0.037**

-0.007

[0.008]

[0.008]

[0.010]

[0.009]

[0.017]

[0.014]

-0.142***

-0.020***

-0.161***

-0.023***

-0.104***

-0.016

[0.009]

[0.006]

[0.010]

[0.007]

[0.016]

[0.010]

-0.026*

-0.062***

-0.028*

-0.074***

0.012

-0.030

[0.014]

[0.013]

[0.016]

[0.014]

[0.028]

[0.026]

Prior (2+)

ConcChrg

(3)

-0.073***

-0.065***

-0.082***

[0.007]

[0.008]

[0.013]

0.008

-0.057

-0.057***

0.022***

-0.143***

-0.089***

[0.101]

[0.051]

[0.011]

[0.008]

[0.017]

[0.012]

Obs.

18,258

27,882

13,083

17,196

5,175

10,686

Mean

0.598

0.296

0.595

0.247

0.607

0.375

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%). This table presents the marginal effects from probit
models in which the outcome variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
initial top charge in a case was dropped, amended to a lesser charge, or dismissed.
Columns (1)–(2) include all cases, while columns (3)–(4) and (5)–(6) include all
misdemeanor and felony cases, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) restrict the
sample to cases in which the defendant had no prior convictions. Columns (2), (4),
and (6) restrict the sample to cases in which the defendant had at least one prior
conviction. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see Appendix
Table 1. All regressions also include a set of crime class fixed effects, a set of crime
type fixed effects, a set of year fixed effects, and controls for the defendant’s age.
4. Gender Disparities in Sentencing
The results presented thus far document the existence of gender disparities in the
plea-bargaining process. This Section examines the role played by these differences
in charge reduction rates in generating gender disparities in ultimate criminal case
outcomes. If judges “undo” the disparities introduced at the plea-bargaining stage by
sentencing female defendants more harshly than male defendants, then the biases
introduced during plea bargaining would be of lesser practical importance.197 This

197. Existing evidence indicates this is likely not the case. See supra notes 40–43 and
accompanying text.
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Section presents evidence that suggests that gender disparities in charge reduction
rates are not corrected during the sentencing stage.
Table 6 presents summary statistics of sentencing outcomes for those cases in
which the defendant was convicted of a crime carrying a possible jail or prison
sentence. As documented in the existing literature, female defendants are less likely
to receive a prison sentence than male defendants. 198 The incarceration rate for male
defendants is 44.83%, substantially higher than that of female defendants, 30.94%. 199
In other words, male defendants are about 44.89% more likely than female
defendants to be incarcerated.200 Moreover, female defendants receive sentences that
are on average 1.69 months shorter than those received by male defendants (3.21
months vs. 1.52 months). 201
Table 6. Sentencing Outcomes by Gender
Panel A: All Cases

Female
Male

Female
Male

Obs.

(1)
Incarceration

(2)
Sentence

6,548
27,392

30.94%
44.83%

1.52
3.21

Panel B: Cases with Felony Convictions
(1)
Obs.
Incarceration

(2)
Sentence

1,829
7,875

3.92
8.53

25.53%
45.09%

Panel C: Cases with Misdemeanor Convictions
(1)
(2)
Obs.
Incarceration
Sentence
Female
Male

4,719
19,517

33.04%
44.73%

0.59
1.06

Note: Panel A includes all cases in which the defendant was convicted of a crime
which carries a possible sentence in jail or prison. Panel B includes cases in which
the defendant was convicted of at least one felony. Panel C includes cases in which
the defendant was convicted of at least one misdemeanor, but of no felonies. Column
(1) in each panel reports the average incarceration rate for each gender group, while
column (2) reports the average highest sentence received by a defendant (in months).

198. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
199. See infra Table 6A, column (1). These figures include those cases in which a sentence
of zero months was imposed.
200. This is equal to the difference in incarceration rates (13.89 percentage points) divided
by the incarceration rate of female defendants (30.94%).
201. See infra Table 6A, column (2). This difference is substantial in relative terms—the
sentences received by male defendants are 111.18% longer than those received by female
defendants.
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In panels B and C of Table 6, cases are divided into two groups—those in which
there was at least one felony conviction (panel B) and those in which defendants
were only convicted of misdemeanor crimes (panel C). Male defendants convicted
of at least one felony are 19.56 percentage points more likely than female defendants
to be incarcerated (45.09% vs. 25.53%)202 and receive sentences that are on average
4.61 months longer than those received by male defendants (8.53 months vs. 3.92
months).203 Looking at sentencing in misdemeanor cases reveals similar disparities.
In these cases, male defendants are 11.69 percentage points more likely than female
defendants to be incarcerated (44.73% vs. 33.04%) 204 and receive sentences that are
almost twice as large as those received by female defendants (1.06 months vs. 0.59
months).205
These gender disparities in incarceration rates and sentence length suggests that
judges are not “correcting” the gender disparities being introduced during the pleabargaining process by sentencing female defendants more harshly than male
defendants. Of course, disparities in raw averages do not take into account
differences in defendant and crime characteristics across cases involving male and
female defendants that may impact judges’ sentencing decisions. A series of models
that control for these factors and are presented in the Appendix confirm that gender
disparities in sentencing are present even after controlling for numerous factors. 206
B. The Intersection of Gender and Race
The results presented above indicate that female defendants receive more lenient
treatment than male defendants during the plea-bargaining process. These gender
disparities are greater in cases involving low-level offenses and defendants with no
prior convictions, patterns that suggest that a defendant’s gender is used as a proxy
for the defendant’s inherent criminality. Race also appears to play a critical role in
determining plea-bargaining outcomes. When considering the entire sample, the
charge reduction rate for black defendants is 6.8 percentage points lower than that of
white defendants.207 Notably, the magnitude of this racial disparity is similar to the
gender disparity identified earlier (5.8 percentage points). 208 A recent article
examining racial disparities in plea bargaining using this dataset finds that racial

202. See supra Table 6B, column (1). This difference represents 76.62% of the
incarceration rate of female defendants.
203. See supra Table 6B, column (2). That is, male defendants convicted of a felony
offense receive sentences that are 117.60% longer than those received by female defendants.
204. See supra Table 6C, column (1). This difference represents 35.38% of the
incarceration rate of male defendants convicted of a misdemeanor offense.
205. See supra Table 6C, column (2).
206. See infra Appendix Table 3. The coefficient on the Female indicator variable for all
models is negative and statistically significant, confirming that female defendants receive
more lenient treatment during sentencing than male defendants.
207. See supra Table 1, column (1). This racial disparity is measured by the coefficient on
the indicator variable Blacki.
208. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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disparities are also greater in cases involving low-level offenses and defendants with
no prior convictions.209
The analyses in this Section examine the intersection of gender and race in the
plea-bargaining process.210 Due to the relatively low number of nonblack and
nonwhite female defendants in the database, these analyses are restricted to cases
involving black and white defendants. Thus, defendants are divided into four groups:
(1) white female, (2) white male, (3) black female, and (4) black male. The baseline
model estimated earlier predicts that white females should be the group with the
highest charge reduction rate in the sample, while black males should be the group
with the lowest charge reduction rate. Moreover, black female and white male
defendants should have similar charge reduction rates.
These predictions, however, assume that race does not mediate the effects of
gender. It could be that racial disparities are driven, for example, by the less favorable
treatment received by black male defendants and that black female defendants are
afforded the same treatment as white female defendants. If that is the case, black and
white female defendants should have the highest charge reduction rates and black
male defendants should have the lowest charge reduction rates (with the charge
reduction rate for white male defendants falling somewhere in between). Or it could
be that gender disparities are being driven by the more favorable treatment received
by white female defendants. In that case, we would expect white female defendants
to have the highest charge reduction rates followed by white male defendants. Black
female and black male defendants would then have the lowest charge reduction rates.
1. Disparities in Charge Reductions
This Section explores differences in charge reduction rates among white female,
white male, black female, and black male defendants. The first part of this Section
analyzes disparities using all cases in the dataset. The second and third parts of this
Section divide cases based on the severity of the offense involved and the criminal
history of the defendant.
a. Baseline Results
Let us first examine differences in charge reduction rates across our four groups.
The existence of racial disparities favoring white over black defendants and gender
disparities favoring female over male defendants suggests that we should observe
high charge reduction rates in cases involving white female defendants and low
charge reduction rates in cases involving black male defendants. That is exactly what
the data reveals. White female defendants receive charge reductions over fifty
percent of the time, while black male defendants receive charge reductions less than
thirty-five percent of the time.211 Notably, charge reductions rates for white male
defendants and black female defendants are similar—43.79% and 41.26%,

209. See Berdejó, supra note 80, at 1188.
210. See supra Section I.C.3.
211. See infra Table 7, column (1).
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respectively—which suggests that the effects of gender and race on plea-bargaining
outcomes are of similar magnitude.212
Table 7. Gender, Race, & Pre-Sentencing Outcomes
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

All Offenses
All

Prior

No Prior

Felonies

Misd.’s

White Female

50.09%

29.26%

66.57%

46.56%

51.80%

White Male

43.79%

30.11%

63.01%

46.10%

42.70%

Black Female

41.26%

27.36%

58.13%

45.41%

39.35%

Black Male

34.23%

30.01%

46.97%

43.11%

8.48%

Note: All columns present the percentage of cases in which the initial top charge was
dropped, amended to a lower charge, or dismissed. Column (1) includes all cases.
Column (2) restricts the sample to cases in which the defendant had at least one prior
conviction, while column (3) restricts the sample to cases in which the defendant had
no prior convictions. Columns (5) and (6) include all cases in which the top initial
charge was a felony or misdemeanor, respectively.
Two related observations are worth highlighting. First, race does not appear to
mediate the effect of gender in plea bargaining. The probability of a white female
defendant receiving a charge reduction is 6.40 percentage points higher than that of
a white male defendant (50.09% vs. 43.79%).213 Gender disparities are similar if we
focus on black defendants—black females receive a charge reduction in 41.26% of
cases, 7.03 percentage points more often than black male defendants.214 Second,
gender does not appear to mediate the effect of race in plea bargaining. The charge
reduction rate for white female defendants is 8.83 percentage points higher than that
of black female defendants.215 The difference in charge reduction rates between
white and black male defendants is just slightly larger at 9.56 percentage points.216
Thus, the effects of a defendant’s gender and race on his or her likelihood of
receiving a charge reduction are complementary (i.e., act as additive effects).
To examine the role of race and gender in plea-bargaining outcomes in a more
rigorous manner, we can estimate the following probit model:217
yi = α + β1Femalei + β2Blacki + β3Femalei*Blacki + β2X i + β3Z i + ε i

(2)

The explanatory variables of interest in this model are: (1) Female, an indicator
variable equal to one if the defendant was a woman; (2) Black, an indicator variable

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See infra Table 7, column (1).
See supra Table 7, column (1).
See supra Table 7, column (1).
See supra Table 7, column (1).
See supra Table 7, column (1).
For a discussion of the probit model see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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equal to one if the defendant was a black individual; and (3) Black*Female, a racegender interaction term. All other variables are the same as described earlier.218 The
interaction term Black*Female will tell us whether race mediates the effect of gender
and vice versa. If black female defendants receive the same treatment as white female
defendants, the coefficient on this interaction term should be positive and of a
magnitude that offsets the coefficient on the Black indicator variable. On the other
hand, if black female defendants receive the same treatment as black male
defendants, then the coefficient on the Black*Female interaction term should be
negative and of a magnitude that offsets the coefficient on the Female indicator
variable. Finally, if the coefficient on the interaction terms is equal to zero, then we
could conclude that gender and racial disparities are independent and additive.
The result for this model is presented in column (2) of Table 1. The coefficient
on the Female*Black interaction term is small and not statistically significant.219 And
the coefficients on the Female and Black indicator variables are similar to the
estimates from the baseline model presented earlier (5.5 and 6.7 percentage points,
respectively).220 This confirms that race does not mediate the effect of gender on a
defendant’s likelihood of receiving lenient treatment and that white females receive
the most lenient treatment of all groups while black males receive the harshest
treatment during the plea-bargaining process.
b. Crime Severity
As discussed earlier, the gender and race of a defendant may affect pleabargaining outcomes if prosecutors employ these observable defendant
characteristics as proxies for the defendant’s inherent criminality, itself an
unobservable characteristic.221 In that case, we should then observe greater gender
and racial disparities in cases involving low-level offenses and lesser disparities in
cases involving more serious offenses, where the crime itself provides information
about the defendant’s inherent criminality. 222
The data is consistent with this prediction. In cases involving felony crimes,
charge reduction rates are similar across the four groups of defendants. The charge
reduction rate for white female defendants (the group with the highest rate) is just
3.45 percentage points higher than the charge reduction rate for black male
defendants (the group with the lowest charge reduction rate) (46.56% vs. 43.11%).223
The charge reduction rate for black female defendants (45.41%) and white male
defendants (46.10%) fall between the other two groups.224 Disparities are
considerably greater if we look at cases involving misdemeanor offenses. In these
cases, the charge reduction rate for white female defendants (the group with the

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See infra Appendix Table 2; supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 1, column (2).
Cf. supra Table 1, columns (1) and (2).
See supra notes 66–69, 85–88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–73, 89–91 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 7, column (4).
See supra Table 7, column (4).
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highest rate) is 23.32 percentage points higher than the charge reduction rate for
black male defendants (the group with the lowest charge reduction rates). 225
Figure 5 illustrates how differences in charge reduction rates across the four
groups are greater in cases involving misdemeanor crimes than in cases involving
felony crimes, a pattern that lends support to the theory that race and gender are used
by prosecutors as proxies for defendants’ risk and inherent criminality when making
plea-bargaining decisions.

Figure 5. Race, Gender & Charge Reduction
Rates by Crime Severity
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Misdemeanors
White Female

White Male

Felonies
Black Female

Black Male

c. Criminal History
As in our earlier analyses of gender disparities, we can examine how defendants’
criminal histories mediate the effects of gender and race in determining pleabargaining outcomes. In cases involving defendants with at least one prior
conviction, disparities across the four groups are relatively small. 226 However, in
cases involving defendants with no prior convictions there are greater disparities
across the four groups.227
In cases involving defendants with no prior convictions, white females have the
highest charge reduction rate across the four groups (66.57%).228 White males are a
close second with a charge reduction rate of 63.01%. 229 The difference, 3.56

225. See supra Table 7, column (5).
226. See supra Table 7, column (2). The difference between the groups with the highest
and lowest charge reduction rates is 2.75 percentage points.
227. See supra Table 7, column (3).
228. See supra Table 7, column (3).
229. See supra Table 7, column (3).
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percentage points, represents 5.65% of the average charge reduction for white males.
However, gender disparities are substantially greater if we focus on black defendants.
The charge reduction rate for black male defendants, 46.97%, is 11.16 percentage
points lower than that of black females, a difference that represents 23.76% of the
charge reduction for black males.230 Gender disparities in the subset of defendants
with no prior convictions thus appear to be driven by black male and female
defendants.231
Figure 6 presents a graphical depiction of these differences in charge reduction
rates across the four groups of defendants. The pattern depicted therein—namely,
lesser disparities in cases involving defendants with a prior criminal record and
greater disparities in cases involving defendants with no prior criminal record—lends
further support to the theory that race and gender are used by prosecutors as proxies
for defendants’ risk and inherent criminality when making plea-bargaining decisions.

Figure 6. Race, Gender & Charge Reduction Rates
by Defendant Criminal History
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
No Prior
White Female

Prior
White Male

Black Female

Black Male

2. Disparities in Sentencing Outcomes
The results presented thus far document the existence of gender and racial
disparities in the plea-bargaining process that significantly disfavor male black
defendants. The analyses in this Section verify whether judges “correct” disparities
introduced in the plea-bargaining stage that adversely affected black males by

230. See supra Table 7, column (3).
231. Similarly, racial disparities in charge reduction rates in cases involving defendants
with no prior convictions appear to be driven by the treatment received by black males. The
charge reduction rate for black females (58.13%) is 8.44 percentage points lower than that of
white females, a difference that represents 14.52% of the average charge reduction for black
females. On the other hand, the charge reduction rate for black males is 16.04 percentage
points lower than that of white males, a difference that represents 34.15% of the average
charge reduction for black males. See supra Table 7, column (3).
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sentencing these defendants less “harshly” than others.232 Table 8 presents summary
statistics of sentencing outcomes for those cases in which the defendant was
convicted of a crime that carries a possible jail or prison sentence.
Table 8. Sentencing Outcomes by Race & Gender

White Female
White Male
Black Female
Black Male

Obs.
3,656
13,898
2,688
11,619

(1)
Incarceration
27.54%
36.78%
36.20%
55.71%

(2)
Sentence
1.36
2.43
1.71
4.27

Note: This table includes all cases in which the defendant was convicted of a crime
which carries a possible sentence in jail or prison. Column (1) reports the average
incarceration rate for each group, while column (2) reports the average highest
sentence received by a defendant (in months).
Rather than “reversing” the disparities introduced in the plea-bargaining process,
sentencing appears to exacerbate these disparities. The lowest incarceration rate
belongs to white females (27.54%) while the highest incarceration rate corresponds
to black males (55.71%).233 That is, the incarceration rate for black males is over
twice as great as that of white females. As was the case with charge reduction rates,
the incarceration rates for white males and black females are similar (36.78% and
36.20%, respectively) and fall in between those of white females and black males.234
Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of these differences in incarceration
across the four groups. Examining sentence length reveals a similar pattern—white
females receive the lowest average sentences, while black males receive the
highest.235

232. Existing evidence indicates this is likely not the case. See supra notes 74–75 and
accompanying text.
233. See supra Table 8, column (1).
234. See supra Table 8, column (1).
235. See supra Table 8, column (2).
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Figure 7. Gender, Race & Incarceration Rates
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CONCLUSION
The results presented in this Article document the existence of gender disparities
in the plea-bargaining stage of the criminal justice system. Female defendants are
more likely than male defendants to receive a reduction in their principal initial
charge.236 These disparities in plea bargaining appear to be driven by cases involving
defendants with no prior convictions237 and less serious offenses.238 These patterns
suggest that in “low information” cases, a defendant’s gender appears to be used by
some prosecutors as a proxy for his or her likelihood to recidivate and latent
criminality.239
The Article also explores the intersection of gender and race in the pleabargaining process, finding that gender and racial disparities complement each other
in a way that yields additive effects. 240 The charge reduction rate for white females
is almost fifty percent higher than that of black males.241 White males and black
females experience similar charge reduction rates, which fall between those of white
females and black males.242 Consistent with the individual analyses of gender and
racial disparities, intergroup disparities are greater in cases involving misdemeanor
offenses and defendants with no prior criminal records.243
These results inform the evaluation of various current policy debates. Efforts to
mitigate gender and racial disparities in the criminal justice system should consider
disparities in the plea-bargaining process. The results presented in this Article also

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra Section III.A.1.a.
See supra Section III.A.3.
See supra Section III.A.2.
See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.B.1.a.
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.B.1.b; III.B.1.c.
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highlight how gender and racial disparities run deeper in misdemeanor cases, adding
an empirical dimension to the concerns of those scholars who have called for the
decriminalization of misdemeanors and for increased scrutiny of the misdemeanor
adjudication process.244 More generally, the possible implicit nature of the biases
driving the disparities uncovered in this Article lends support to those who have
argued that the weight afforded to evidence showing disparate impact in equal
protection claims should be reexamined.245
The results and conclusions presented in this Article are subject to some caveats.
As with most empirical work in this area, it is difficult to establish a causal link
between defendants’ characteristics (such as gender or race) and criminal case
outcomes (in this case, charge reductions). One concern is that the models estimated
above may not be accounting for certain crime and defendant characteristics that play
a role in determining plea-bargaining outcomes and that are also correlated with the
gender or race of the defendant.246 Failing to control for such unobservable variables
could be biasing the results. Similarly, it could be that prosecutors are relying on
defendant characteristics other than gender or race—but that are correlated with
gender or race—to assess the risk posed by a defendant and that these defendant
characteristics are not being controlled for in the analyses above. Finally, the dataset
includes cases from 2000–2006 and the results may not necessarily be representative
of Dane County’s current criminal justice system. 247 In 2010, the Wisconsin
governor appointed Dane County’s first African American district attorney. 248 And
starting in 2016, Dane County has provided implicit bias training for judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders.249 It will be interesting to see whether recent

244. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Section III.A.1.b.
247. See supra Section I.B.1.
248. In 2010, the Wisconsin governor appointed Ismael Ozanne as Dane County’s district
attorney. Mr. Ozanne, who was subsequently elected and reelected in 2012 and 2016, has
implemented internal policies seeking to address racial discrimination. Ed Treleven, Ismael
Ozanne Re-Elected as DA over Prosecutor Bob Jambois, WIS. ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/ismael-ozanne-re-elected-as-da-over
-prosecutor-bob-jambois/article_7b015c97-1a1b-53e0-b0fd-b65428a8e203.html
[https://
perma.cc/6HUK-YBXN]; Ed Treleven, Race for Dane DA Has Experienced Underling
Sniping at the Incumbent, WIS. ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2016), https://madison.com/wsj/news
/local/govt-and-politics/race-for-dane-da-has-experienced-underling-sniping-at-the/article
_649d917e-953c-57e6-bc24-fb85c7f913d2.html [https://perma.cc/B7SS-AYW8].
249. Dane County recently adopted a number of recommendations made by workgroups
charged with evaluating policies to improve the criminal justice system. Among these
recommendations was the implementation of an ongoing “Implicit Bias, Racial Equity and
Inclusion, Diversity and Poverty Training” for judges, prosecutors, and public defenders,
among others. DANE CTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, INVESTIGATING SOLUTIONS TO RACIAL
DISPARITIES AND MENTAL HEALTH CHALLENGES IN THE DANE COUNTY JAIL AND THROUGHOUT
DANE COUNTY’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: WORKGROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2015).
These implicit bias trainings are already taking place. Chris Rochester & Tyler Brandt, Dane
County Spends $50,000 to Send Courthouse Staff to “Implicit Bias” Training, MACIVER INST.
(Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.maciverinstitute.com/2016/08/dane-county-spends-50000-to
-send-courthouse-staff-to-implicit-bias-training [https://perma.cc/G7LQ-DLND].
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changes in policies and personnel training have been effective in addressing the
disparities documented earlier.
Setting these caveats aside, there is no reason why the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion (and the plea-bargaining process) should not be subject to the same
rigorous empirical scrutiny that has been applied to judicial decision-making (and
the sentencing process).250 It would be interesting to see whether the disparities
documented in this Article are present in other jurisdictions. Future work can also
focus more closely on the role of the prosecutor by examining, for example, which
attributes and characteristics of prosecuting attorneys (if any) explain differences in
plea-bargaining outcomes251 or documenting the existence of significant
heterogeneity across individual prosecuting attorneys. 252
Conducting this type of empirical work requires detailed data that provides
information on pre-sentencing decisions made by prosecutors. Most empirical work
has focused on judges’ sentencing decisions because public entities at the state and
federal levels collect and maintain comprehensive data on sentencing. 253 There needs
to be a similar level of transparency with respect to decisions taken by actors in the
pre-sentencing stages of the criminal justice system. Collecting and maintaining such
data certainly presents a more complex and challenging endeavor than collecting
data on sentencing decisions, both in terms of the number of observations and
variables. However, the Wisconsin circuit courts’ CCAP shows that this can be
achieved.254 And a number of district attorney offices across the nation have tried to
collect and use data to internally identify and address instances of biases in the

250. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
251. Studies analyzing differences in judges’ sentencing behavior based on judges’
demographic characteristics have been inconclusive. While some studies have found
differences between male and female judges and between minority and white judges, other
studies have not. See Abrams et al., supra note 75, at 372–74 (finding that black judges are
associated with longer sentences but lower incarceration rates); Claire S.H. Lim, Bernardo S.
Silveira & James M. Snyder, Jr., Do Judges’ Characteristics Matter? Ethnicity, Gender, and
Partisanship in Texas State Trial Courts, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 302, 305 (2016) (finding
that demographic characteristics of judges have little effect on sentence length);
Schanzenbach, supra note 40, at 73 (finding that judicial demographics have little effect on
average prison sentences though they may impact racial and gender disparities); Darrell
Steffensmeier & Chester L. Britt, Judge’s Race and Judicial Decision Making: Do Black
Judges Sentence Differently?, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 749, 757–58 (2001) (finding that black judges
are more likely to incarcerate offenders than white judges); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris
Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of
Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163, 1174–75 (1999) (finding that female judges are
more likely to incarcerate offenders and impose slightly longer sentences than male judges).
252. Recent studies on judges’ sentencing behavior have focused on individual judges,
finding substantial heterogeneity in average incarceration rates and sentencing length across
judges. See Abrams et al., supra note 75, at 367–68 (finding that judges’ decisions show
significant heterogeneity in all sentencing measures, including incarceration, average sentence
length, and average sentence length conditional on receiving a nonzero jail sentence); Lim et
al., supra note 251, at 305 (finding substantial heterogeneity in sentencing harshness across
judges).
253. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Section II.B.
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exercise of prosecutorial discretion.255 The availability of this type of information
would also allow courts and other external groups to scrutinize prosecutorial
decision-making, an area that traditionally has been less open to the public than
sentencing.256 Decision-makers exercising discretion in a transparent criminal justice
system can be held accountable and this accountability can help legitimize the system
in the eyes of all citizens.257

255. See MCKENZIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7.
256. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
257. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., RACE AND PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN, supra note 38, at
9 (“Prosecutors, as powerful actors in the criminal justice system, are empowered to adopt
measures that promise to significantly promote equity for all people throughout all stages of
the criminal justice continuum. Doing so will require a commitment to accountability and
transparency.”).
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APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1. Description of Main Explanatory Variables

Black

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant was African American.

Other

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant was not African
American or Caucasian.

Female

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the defendant was a woman.

Age

Equal to the age of the defendant as of the initial filing and
calculated as the year of the case filing minus the defendant’s year
of birth.

Prior (1)

Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant had one prior conviction.

Prior (2+)

Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant had two or more prior
convictions.

ConcCov

Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant was convicted of at least
two charges. In specifications restricted to felonies, it is equal to 1
if there are at least two felony convictions. In specifications
restricted to misdemeanors, it’s equal to 1 if there are at least two
misdemeanor convictions.

ConcChrg

Indicator variable equal to 1 if defendant was initially charged with
at least two crimes. In specifications restricted to felonies, it is equal
to 1 if there are at least two felony charges. In specifications
restricted to misdemeanors, it’s equal to 1 if there are at least two
misdemeanor charges.

Trial

Indicator variable equal to 1 if any of the charges in a case were
adjudicated in a trial.
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Appendix Table 2. Crime Type Categories
Bail Jumping (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.49 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Battery - Special (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.201, 203 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Battery (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.19–.20 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Burglary (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.10 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Child Abuse (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Child Neglect/Fail to Support (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.21–.23 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2018))
Crimes Against Animals (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Criminal Damage to Property (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.01 (West 2005 & Supp.
2018))
Disorderly Conduct (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.01 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Drug Manufacture/Deliver (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41(1) (West 2007 &
Supp.2018))
Drug Possession (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41(3g) (West 2007 & Supp. 2018))
Drug Possession w/ Intent (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 961.41(1m), (2) (West 2007 &
Supp. 2018))
Endangering Safety (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.30 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Escape (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.42 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Fail to Report to Jail (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.425 (West 2005))
Fleeing Officer (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.04 (West 2019))
Forgery/Fraudulent Writing (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.37–.40 (West 2005 & Supp.
2018))
Fraud on Merchants (Non-Retail) (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.21) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2018))
Hit and Run (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.67–.69 (West 2019))
Homicide (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.01–.10 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Injury by Intoxicated Use of Vehicle (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.25 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2018))
Intimidate Witness/Victim (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.42–.45 (West 2005 & Supp.
2018))
Operate Vehicle Without Consent (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.23 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2018))
Other Crimes Against Children (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.30–.62 (West 2005))
Other Drug Offenses (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 961.41(4), .42–.65 (West 2007 &
Supp. 2018))
Other Felony
Other Misdemeanor
OWI/PAC (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.63 (West 2019))
OWI/PAC w/Child (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.63 (West 2019))
Receiving Stolen Property (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.34 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Reckless/Negligent Injuries (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.23–.24 (West 2005 & Supp.
2018))
Resisting Arrest (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.41 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
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Robbery (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.32 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Sex Crimes (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.15–.32 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Stalking (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.32 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Theft - Credit Card (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.41 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Theft - Identity (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.201–.203 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Theft - Retail (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Theft (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.20 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Threats to Injure/Accuse of Crime (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.30 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2018))
Threats/Harassment (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.012–.013 (West 2005 & Supp.
2018))
Trespass (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.125–.145 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Violation of TRO (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 813.12–.128 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
Weapons/Explosives (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.20–.315 (West 2005 & Supp.
2018))
Worthless Checks (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.24 (West 2005 & Supp. 2018))
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Appendix Table 3. Explaining Sentencing Outcomes
(1)

(2)

(3)

All

Female
Black
Other

(4)

(5)

Felonies

(6)

Misdemeanors

Sent.

Incar.

Sent.

Incar.

Sent.

Incar.

-1.174***

-0.126***

-3.302***

-0.179***

-0.380***

-0.109***

[0.099]

[0.0072]

[0.356]

[0.013]

[0.034]

[0.008]

1.001***

0.152***

2.600***

0.101***

0.449***

0.171***

[0.109]

[0.006]

[0.388]

[0.012]

[0.032]

[0.007]

0.0818

0.0749***

0.084

[0.013]

[1.155]

[0.027]

[0.056]

[0.015]

0.0872***

1.542***

0.071***

0.161***

0.0925***

[0.152]

[0.009]

[0.598]

[0.019]

[0.025]

[0.011]

1.919***

0.245***

4.811***

0.227***

0.983***

0.253***

[0.139]

[0.007]

[0.538]

[0.013]

[0.030]

[0.008]

1.452***

0.009

7.243***

0.169***

0.411

0.0671

[0.148]

[0.007]

[0.762]

[0.016]

[0.943]

[0.377]

Mean
Outcome

2.881

0.423

7.662

0.414

0.967

0.427

Obs.

33,933

33,783

9,704

9,681

24,229

24,092

R-squared

0.403

Priors (2+)
ConcCov

0.0759

[0.279]
0.429***

***

-0.775

Priors (1)

-0.0581

***

0.399

0.091

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets (* significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The outcome variable in columns (1), (3), and (5)
is the length (in months) of the highest sentence (capped at 720 months) received
by the defendant. The outcome variable in columns (2), (4), and (6) is an
indicator variable equal to one if the defendant received a prison or jail sentence.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the results of ordinary least squares
specifications, while columns (2), (4), and (6) present the marginal effects from
a probit model. For a description of the explanatory variables of interest see
Appendix Table 1. All regressions include a set of crime class fixed effects (i.e.,
maximum statutory sentence), a set of crime type fixed effects, and a set of year
fixed effects.

